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INTRODUCTION

Most prominent models of visual object
perception (e.g.
Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982) view the
apprehension of a

particular object in an image as exclusively
based on a
data-driven and pre-conceptual recovery of the

object's

structural features (i.e. geons, contoursegments,
etc.) from
the image. Research on object perception in full
scene

context, however, has suggested that this view may
need to

be modified if one wishes to model more than the perception
of unanticipated, isolated objects.

The purpose of the

present thesis is to contribute to an evaluation of the
degree to which this challenge should be taken seriously.

The first chapter of this thesis will present and discuss
the two main lines of research developed in the study of

effects of scene context on object identification.

An

initial section in this chapter will deal with research

concentrating on the question whether scene context has any
influence on the nature of the pattern recognition processes
involved in object identification.

The central assumption

in this research is that prior to or during the first glance

at a real-world scene, a scene-specific schema or frame is

activated which provides an integrated representation of the
typical makeup and contents of the viewed scene.

Based on

this assumption, several authors have advanced the hypo-

thesis that the identification of objects with a high

1

probability of appearance in

a given scene,

is based on the

concept-driven and resource-inexpensive
detection of global
object features specified in the frame
representing
that

scene.

This in contrast, they propose, to either
improbable
or isolated objects which are identified
on the basis
of a

data-driven and resource-demanding analysis of
visual
detail. While the studies designed to test this

hypothesis

have generally yielded results which have been taken
to
corroborate its validity, a detailed examination of the

evi-

dence will be presented in order to demonstrate that this

conclusion may be unwarranted.

A second section will review research which emphasizes
that scene context affects object identification by pro-

viding a frame of reference in which spatial object-context
relations define a set of relational object features which
are used as a basis for object recognition.

Based on an

analysis of what distinguishes a well-formed, natural scene
from an unstructured array of isolated objects, it has been

argued that an object's appearance in such a scene can not
only be characterized as probable, but also conforms to a
limited set of fundamental spatial object-context relations.
The concrete realization of these relations in the appear-

ance of a particular object in a particular scene is con-

sidered to be quite stable across instances of that

object-scene combination.

Consequently, an object's typical

spatial relations to a scene it is likely to appear in, are

taken to be an integral part of the global schema for that

scene.

Under the assumption that such
schemas are inevitably activated in the earliest stages
of scene exploration,
it has been hypothesized that
relational object features are
an integral part of the image information
used for object
identification in scenes, since a number of
studies
examining this hypothesis appear to indicate
that violations
of spatial object-context relations decrease
the identifiability of objects, its validity has generally
been
accepted.

Again however, a detailed discussion of this

research will be presented in order to demonstrate that
this
conclusion may not be justified.

Based on the review presented in the first chapter, it
will be argued that only an object's probability of

appearing in a scene can safely be regarded as having a
genuine effect on the ease with which the object can be
identified.

One can therefore pose the question of how

existing models of object perception should be modified in
order to account for this contextual effect.

In order to

answer this question, it is necessary to decide between two
alternative views that have been proposed in order to
account for the object probability effect.

On the first

view, the effect reflects a top-down influence of a global

scene-schema, resulting in the concept-driven identification
of individual objects.

If correct, this would necessitate a

drastic revision of the presently accepted data-driven
accounts of object perception.

On the second view, however,

such a revision would not be required
since it attributes
the object probability effect to the
operation of a passive
priming mechanism between the individual
object representations that are used to categorize the
object models
computed through data-driven feature analysis
of
an image.

The remainder of the thesis therefore will
focus on
evaluating the validity of this simpler and
more conservative inter-object priming account.

Specifically, the second chapter will identify three

possible constraints on this priming mechanism, which,
if

proven to be true limits, could serve as basis for an
empirical and unequivocal test of the mechanism's validity
as an explanation of context effects in full scenes.

Finally, in the third chapter two experiments are

reported which were designed to test the existence of these
three possible constraints.

Based on the results obtained

in these experiments, some conclusions are offered with

regard to the nature of the inter-object priming mechanism
and a test of its role in an account of real-world scene

perception.

^

CHAPTER

1

EFFECTS OF SCENE CONTEXT ON OBJECT
IDENTIFICATION:

A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEORIES

Effects of Scene Context on Pa ttern

Processes

i

T^Pnnr^ni

i-

n Object Identification

As mentioned earlier, most research on scene
context
effects has been inspired by the assumption that
real-world
scene perception is mediated by scene-specific schemas,

activated prior to or during the first few glances at
scene.

a

The rationale behind this central assumption and the

predictions that have been derived from it with respect to
the context-sensitivity of object pattern recognition, have

been outlined most clearly by Friedman (1979).

In her frame theory of scene perception, Friedman sets

out from the position that apprehending natural scenes and

their components from arrays of optical information requires
an interaction between the output of low-level feature

analyzers and a priori knowledge about how those features go

together and what scene (component) these feature combinations signify.

This a priori knowledge, she assumes, takes

on the form of frames (or schemas) which each constitute a

representation of a particular reality at a specific level
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of abstraction or globality (e.g.
shape-frames, volumeframes, object-frames, place-frames,
scene- frames, etc.).

At the basis of this assumption lies
the view that frames
-as outlined in various theories of
world knowledge
representation (e.g. Bobrow
Palmer, 1975; Schank

&

&

Norman, 1975; Minsky, 1975;

Abelson, 1977)- have certain

properties which allow them to function as powerful
pattern
interpreters.
The first one is that they employ an abstract repre-

sentational format (i.e. propositions or procedures) which

allows for the integration into one frame of the viewer's

knowledge about both the semantic and physical characteristics of its real-world referent.

Consequently, as Palmer

(1975) points out, no resources need to be spent in trans-

lating visual information into a code allowing for its

meaningful interpretation.

A second property is that they represent

a particular

reality in a prototypical fashion, i.e. in terms of both its
invariant characteristics and limited ranges or probabilistic distributions of concrete values its variable charac-

teristics can take on.

This implies that, given sufficient-

ly broad experience with exemplars of scenes and their

components,

i)

a limited number of these frames will provide

sufficient power and flexibility to interpret

a wide variety

of feature patterns, and ii) these representations can serve
as a basis for generating accurate expectations about the

visual and semantic characteristics the instances of its

referent are likely to have.

Consequently, if it would be

possible to access a frame prior to an
extensive pattern
analyis of a scene or object, then this
could substantially
reduce the time and effort required for the
recognition of
that scene or object. This because such access

would provide

a frame of reference for generating
expectations that can

constrain the universe of all possible pattern tests
to the
subset of those that are most likely to lead to a
coherent

interpretation of the pattern at hand.

According to Friedman, it is precisely a third general

property of frames which enables this kind of access.
Specifically, this property is that frames (as a consequence
of the abstract representational format they employ -

Fischler, 1978-) need to specify their referents in a rela-

tive fashion.

For this purpose they draw upon a varied

repertoire of physical and semantic relations (e.g. probability of co-occurence, relative size and location, partstructure, properties, class membership, etc.).
of frames is illustrated in Figure
of) what a

1

This aspect

which represents (part

'face-frame' could look like.

The important thing to note about this frame representa-

tion of a face is that it not only stipulates overall face

properties (i.e. shape but others like for instance color or

dimensionality may be added)

.

Indeed, it also makes explicit

the face's internal and external structure by defining it as

having parts (eyes, nose and mouth) which each have properties of their own as well as a particular size, location

person

value

<0>
Figure

1.

Representation of a 'face-frame' according to
Palmer (1975).

-the vector symbols- and orientation relative to the face,

and as being a part of a person with a particular size,
location and orientation relative to that person.

Further-

more, it should be noted that each argument in a frame can

itself be considered to be the referent of another
frame, which allows for the organization of frames into

systems representing scenes and their components at multipl
levels of abstraction or globality (Hanson
McArthur, 1982; Palmer, 1975).

&

Riseman, 1978;

With respect to the issue o

frame access this implies that a
particular frame can be
accessed and constrain further processing
either on the
basis of a partial or lower-level
analysis of a pattern
instance of its referent, or on the basis
of expectations
generated by frames representing the visual
and semantic
context of its referent.

In order to examine the validity of this frame
theory of

scene perception, Friedman outlined and tested its
implications for object identification in scenes. Specifically,
she proposes that scenes are rarely encountered out of

context and that consequently the appropriate scene-frame
will generally be accessed prior to the actual viewing of
the scene.

Since this scene-frame specifies the scene's

prototypical internal structure (i.e. objects and background
components that typically appear in the scene as well as

relations that usually hold between them) its activation
will generate expectations about what objects are likely to
be present in the scene and what the typical features of

these objects are.

Given the fact that the object repre-

sentations activated in this manner are arguments in a

global scene-frame rather than frames which are fully ex-

panded at the object level, they will specify only those
object features which need to be detected in addition to the

available contextual information in order to establish the

presence of the object in question in that scene.

Specifi-

cally, Friedman contends that global object features (e.g.
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shape, dimensionality, texture,
etc.) are sufficient for
this purpose.
Consequently, she claims, the
identification
of an object in a scene it is likely
to appear in, is generally based on a rapid and resource-inexpensive
detection of
its global features suggested by the
previously activated
frame for that scene. Alternatively, if an
object is unlikely to appear in a given scene the prior
activation of

the corresponding scene-frame is to no avail
and the object
will have to be identified on the basis of a slower
and more

resource-demanding interaction between a more detailed
feature analysis and a frame which is fully expanded at
the

object level of representation.
In order to test this hypothesis, Friedman presented

subjects with two series of pictures.

The first contained

line drawings of scenes which each were shown for 30 sec

after the subjects had been cued with the general theme of
the scene in order to activate the hypothesized scene-frame.

During the viewing of these scenes eye movements were recorded.

The second series contained the same scenes along

with distractor versions in which individual objects had
been altered, relocated, substituted or deleted.

Prior to

the viewing of the first set, subjects were informed that

they would have to be able to distinguish the scenes they
were about to see from new scenes in which, for example,
only a small object detail would be different.

For all ob-

jects presented in the pictures, ratings of their a priori

probability of appearance in the scene had been collected

prior to the experiment.

With regard to the nature of object
pattern recognition
processes, Friedman predicted two things

in this experiment.

First, under the assumption that the
duration of the first
fixation on an object (FFD) reflects the
time needed to
encode and identify an object, she expected
that the hypo-

thesized difference between rapid global feature
detection
and time-consuming detailed feature analysis
should be
reflected in longer first fixations on improbable
than on
probable objects. Second, she predicted that this difference should also lead to superior memory for the details
of improbable objects and that consequently distractors
in

which improbable objects had been slightly altered should be
discriminated more accurately from the original scenes.
An analysis of the recorded eye movement patterns and

recognition data confirmed both predictions.

Apparently,

this supports the theory that placing an object in a consis-

tent scene does indeed alter the object's pattern recognition from a data-driven process of detailed feature analysis
to a schema-driven process of global feature detection.
It is important to note however, that this can only be

maintained if the FFD-dif f erences can unambiguously be
interpreted as a direct reflection of this qualitative
change in pattern recognition processes.

This because the

finding of superior memory for details of improbable objects
does not constitute a sufficient basis for inferring such a
change.

Indeed, Friedman also found that subjects were less

successful in recognizing
distractor scenes in which
probable Objects had been completely
deleted or substituted by
another object rather than merely
altered in some
detail.

While this suggests that scene
information is memorized in
reference to a schema-like representation
of that scene

(i.e.

episodic memory for a given scene appears
to include
only its general theme and those scene
elements which
de-

viate from the already stored schema)

,

it also indicates

that, regardless of the amount of detail in
which a probable

object has been patten analyzed, this information
is less
likely to enter episodic scene memory than is the

case for

improbable objects.

It follows then that if one wishes to

maintain that this study clearly supports the notion of
schema-mediated qualitative differences in the pattern

recognition processes underlying probable and improbable
object identification, one should be able to regard the

FFD-dif ferences as sufficient proof of this.

This however,

does not appear to be a self-evident matter since Henderson,
Pollatsek, and Rayner (1987, 1988) reported a series of

experiments suggesting a quite different explanation of
these FFD-dif ferences.
Specifically, these authors found that foveal viewing of
a single object prior to making a saccade to a semantically

related extraf oveally located target object, facilitated the
target's identification (as measured by both naming latency
and FFD) when it in turn was fixated.

Clearly, since this

effect was observed using arrays of isolated objects rather

than coherent, expected scenes,
Friedman's theory can not
adequately explain its appearance.
Rather, Henderson et al.
propose, the effect can be interpreted
as reflecting
the

operation of an automatic object-to-object
priming process,
i.e. a spreading of activation in
a network of
individual

object representations.
It is clear that this priming mechanism is
in need of

further specification.

Specifically, it still remains to be

determined at which level of representation it operates
(the
distinction Kroll and Potter (1984) make between a form-specific object lexicon and an amodal conceptual store seems

particularly relevant here)

.

in addition,

it is not clear

yet what the precise nature of its influence is, i.e. does
it primarily affect visual object processing or accessing of

the object's conceptual identity?

In spite of these theore-

tical questions however, there are sufficient grounds for

assuming that the inter-object priming mechanism could very
well serve as an alternative to Friedman's explanation of
the FFD-dif f erences she observed in full scenes.
First, as Henderson et al. point out, it seems quite

reasonable to argue that objects appearing in the same scene
tend to be semantically related.

In addition, there appears

to be evidence for the idea that a pattern of consecutive

fixations on different objects (which, judging from the

Henderson et al. research, is

a

necessary condition for ob-

taining inter-object priming) is not an exclusive charac-

teristic of visual exploration in arrays of isolated ob-
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jects.

That objects also constitute the
perceptually most
relevant fixation locations in natural
scenes, has been

suggested in research by Antes, Singsaas,
and Metzger (1978)
and Metzger and Antes (1983). These authors
demonstrated
that object processing is quicker and more
complete when the
objects are brought into foveal vision, while
the processing
of setting and background information is most
efficient in
extrafoveal vision.

In view of these considerations,

it

does not appear to be unreasonable to raise the question

whether priming at the level of individual object representations rather than generating object identity hypotheses
at the level of global scene schemas, underlies the shorter

identif cation times Friedman reported for probable objects.

A study which seems to provide evidence directly relevant
to this question is presented by Antes and Penland (1981).
In this experiment a direct comparison was made between eye

movement patterns of subjects looking at a full scene ('high
context' or HC-condition) or at a 'low context'

(LC)

version

of that scene, i.e. at an array of isolated objects con-

structed by simply removing all background and some of the
objects present in the full scene.

Two of the objects

appearing in both HC- and LC-displays had

a priori been

rated as being highly improbable in the HC-display and were

designated as improbable targets.

From the remaining ob-

jects appearing in both displays (which all had been rated
as probable) two were designated as probable targets.

Sub-

jects saw each display for

4

seconds in preparation of an

object recognition test immediately
following each display.
Guided by Friedman's theory and the
additional assumption
that complete and coherent natural scenes
contain global

contextual information which is extracted very
rapidly and
provides immediate access to the corresponding

scene schema,

Antes and Penland made two predictions which may
be directly
relevant to the schemas versus priming issue. First,
they

expected the global contextual information in the HC-displays to lead to scene schema activation.

As a result,

FFD's on probable targets in those displays were predicted
to be shorter than those on the same objects in the LC-displays, where no contextual information was available to

activate the appropriate scene schema.

Secondly, they

predicted that in the HC-displays only, saccades towards
probable targets would be longer than those towards improbable targets, reflecting a greater useful field of view
for the probable objects.

Since Antes and Penland do not

clearly outline the rationale underlying this second prediction, I assume that they based it on the idea that the

detection of global object features specified in an activated scene schema, can occur further in extrafoveal

vision and more compellingly suggests the presence of an
object than is the case for data-driven recovery of detailed
object features.

Consequently, since objects appear to be

the preferred fixation locations in natural scenes, one

could indeed argue that probable objects will elicit sac-

.
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cades over a greater distance than
improbable objects.
Obviously, such an effect should not
be expected in the
LC-displays where scene schema activation
is assumed

to be

absent

An analysis of eye movement patterns showed
no significant probability-related FFD-dif f erences in

either the LC-

or HC-displays, but did reveal that while the
FFD's for

improbable targets were unaffected by context, those
for

probable targets were significantly shorter in the HCthan
in the LC-displays.
Secondly, it was found that mean saccadic amplitude was not affected by target probability in
the LC-displays, but was significantly greater for probable

than for improbable targets in the HC-displays.
At first sight, these findings appear to be quite consistent with the notion that global scene schema activation

rather than inter-object priming underlies probability-related differences in ease of object identification in scenes.

A first observation causing problems for the priming approach seems to be the absence of
LC-displays.

a

priming effect in the

Since the Henderson et al.

(1987,

1988)

findings seem to be reliable -priming between semantically

related objects surfaced in each of their experiments as
well as in previous research (e.g. Huttenlocher

&

Kubicek,

1983)-, this seems to suggest that the assumption that ob-

jects appearing in the same scene are generally semantically

related is incorrect.

However, before concluding from this

that inter-object priming has no explanatory validity with

regard to the context-sensitivity
of object identification
in scenes, there is one important
consideration

to be made,

specifically, it appears to be quite
possible that, due to
differences in the makeup of LC- and
HC-displays, priming of
probable targets only occurred in the latter
type of displays.
As a result of a much smaller total number
of ob-

jects and a substantially larger proportion of
improbable
objects in the LC-displays, the frequency with
which the
fixation of a probable target was preceded by a fixation

on

another probable object can safely be assumed to have
been

considerably lower in the LC- than in the HC-displays.
Obviously, this could within the confines of the priming
model, explain the FFD-dif f erences observed in this study.

As for determining the extent to which the saccadic

amplitude findings necessitate the conclusion that global
scene schemas drive individual object identification in
scenes, the situation is somewhat more complicated.
First, it is not entirely certain whether the greater

saccadic amplitude for probable targets in the HC-displays
does indeed indicate that the presence of these objects can
in general be detected at greater distances.

Indeed, the

effect does not appear to be very reliable since, in a study

very similar to that by Antes and Penland (1981)

,

Loftus and

Mackworth (1978) did not find any probability-associated
differences in mean saccadic amplitude prior to target
fixation.

According to Antes and Penland however, these

findings do not challenge their theory.

They point out that
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the absence of a saccadic amplitude
difference could very
well be an artefact attributable to
the fact that the improbable objects in the Loftus and
Mackworth (1978) stimuli
tend to -stand out- more than the
probable objects. Judging
from the stimulus example Loftus and
Mackworth present,
this

could indeed be the case since here the
improbable target
(i.e. an octopus consisting exclusively
of curvilinear line
segments) is clearly more visually dissimilar to
its context

farm scene predominantly made up out of straight
lines at
sharp angles) than its probable counterpart (i.e. a
trac(a

tor)

.

Consequently, it seems that there is indeed some

ground for arguing that in this study easily detectable low
level physical discrepancies between improbable objects and

their context may have compensated for their inferior detec-

tability in extrafoveal vision, which is supposedly demonstrated in the Antes and Penland (1981) experiment.

A second question then

is,

whether inter-object priming

could account for these detectability-dif f erences as well as
schema theory does.

In this respect,

I

do not consider the

absence of saccadic amplitude differences in the LC-displays
to constitute evidence against the plausibility of such an
account.

Apart from the fact that it is not clear whether

any priming occurred here, there also seems no reason to

expect saccadic amplitude differences in this condition,
even if priming were to allow for primed object detection at

greater distances than is the case for unprimed objects.
This because in arrays of isolated objects, every bit of
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extrafoveal information suggests
the presence of an object
(and consequently a perceptually
relevant fixation location)
regardless of the degree to which it is
compatible
with activated object representations.
,

As for the saccadic amplitude differences
in the HC-displays, there is some evidence that inter-object
priming
could account for them. Using gaze duration
as a measure of

target identification time in arrays of isolated
objects,
Henderson, Pollatsek, and Rayner (1988) tested explicitly
for the overadditive effect of foveal prime and
extrafoveal

target preview which one would expect if priming were to enhance extrafoveal target processing.

Their results revealed

that having a related object in the fovea did indeed enhance
the amount of facilitation derived from an extrafoveal

preview beyond what can be expected on the basis of
additivity of priming and preview effects.

a mere

Admittedly, a

comparison of these results with those of a similar analysis
in their first series of experiments (Henderson et al.,
1987)

,

indicates that this enhancement of extrafoveal target

processing is contingent upon extensive processing of the
foveal prime (i.e. explicit identification and memorization)

.

Consequently, one could argue that this finding may

not reflect a process characteristic for all situations
involving real-world scene perception.

However, it does

clearly indicate that inter-object priming could be at the
basis of the saccadic amplitude differences in the Antes and

Penland (1981) study, in which subjects were explicitly
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required to memorize scenes in
anticipation of an object recognition test.

Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, it appears to
be a reasonable conclusion that none of the evidence
reported here,

unequivocally indicates that context-consistent object
identification in scenes is based on a concept-driven
detec-

tion of global object features specified in a global
scene
schema activated prior to or during the earliest stages of
scene perception.

Indeed, all of the observed effects can

equally well be accounted for by the assumption that datadriven access to an object representation primes related
object representations, thus reducing the thresholds for
establishing a match between them and the object features

recovered in a further data-driven analysis of the image.
While it is clear that this priming process still needs
some further specification and research, it does seem to

hold the promise of

a

simpler and more powerful account of

context effects on object identification, than what can be

provided by a theory centered around the notion of global
scene schemas.

Indeed,

it avoids the problem -posed by the

Antes and Penland (1981) findings- of having to outline

a

theory on how the appropriate scene schema is very rapidly
activated in the absence of clear scene expectations (see

Biederman (1981, 1988) for some speculative notes on this

.

topic)
.

In addition,

it accounts for context
effects in

both natural scenes and arrays of
isolated objects, enlarging its explanatory scope relative to
that of schema
theory
However, before this can be taken to
provide sufficient
grounds for entirely dismissing the schema
approach to this
domain, it is necessary to examine a second
strain of

research claiming that global scene-schemas play
a major
role in the identification of individual objects
in

scenes.

Specifically, the following section of this chapter will
be

devoted to a discussion of the possibility that object
identification in scenes does not only involve pattern

recognition of the object itself, but is also based on the
use of global scene schemas which allow

for the extraction

of object-diagnostic information from an object's spatial

relations to the scene it appears in.
This discussion is important since it is quite clear
that, contrary to what is the case for an approach centered

around global scene schemas, inter-object priming can not
explain effects of spatial contextual information on object
perception.

Consequently, any evidence for context effects

of spatial scene-structure would invalidate inter-object

priming and endorse scene schema ativation as the central
notion in a complete account of the context-sensitivity of
object identification in real-world scenes.

.
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Based on an analysis of what characterizes
the appearance
of objects in coherent natural scenes,
several authors have

argued that like an object's pattern
characteristics its
relation to the scene it appears in provides
information
about the object's identity (Biederman,
1981; Biederman,
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Klatsky, Teitelbaum,

Mezza-

notte,

&

Biederman, 1981)

First, they point out, the appearance of objects
in

scenes will typically reflect their fundamental physical
nature, i.e. the fact that they are entities with a certain

mass and density.

Their resulting susceptibility to gravity

and incapability to occupy the same position their sur-

roundings occupy, is directly evident in a general tendency
for objects to appear supported by some surface and cause

occlusions in the scene they appear in.

Consequently,

Biederman and his colleagues argue, two object-context
relations can be identified (i.e. Support and Interposition )

,

which for any object in any natural scene provide in-

formation with regard to its general physical identity.
Secondly, these authors claim, the appearance of objects
in natural scenes has several additional characteristics

which allow for the definition of three more object-context
relations which also hold for any object in any coherent
scene, but provide more specific information pertaining to
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the semantic identity of objects.

racteristics involved are

i)

Specifically, the cha-

the fact that objects are ty-

pically found in some scenes and not
in others,
tendency for objects to occupy privileged

ii)

the

positions in the

scenes they are likely to be found in, and
iii) the existence of typical and stable size ratios between
objects
appearing in the same scene. One can therefore

argue that

Probability

,

Position and Size relations can be defined

which allow for the formation of hypotheses about
an object's conceptual identity on the basis of global and/or
local interpretations of the scene it appears in (i.e.

interpretations concerning the scene's global theme and/or
the identity of other objects appearing in it)

.

Clearly, this characterization of the appearance of

objects in natural scenes suggests that the research discussed in the first section may only have captured part of
the context-sensitivity of object identification by ex-

clusively focusing on the effects of purely conceptual
aspects of context (i.e. individual object probability in a
scene or semantic relatedness between consecutively attended
objects) on object pattern recognition.

Specifically, the

question is raised here whether the spatial structure inherent in natural scenes does not provide a contextual

definition of an additional set of relational object features (i.e. Support

.

Interposition

.

Size and Position

are taken into account during object identification.

)

which
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Before examining the evidence relevant
to answering this
question, it should be pointed out that
the distinction
between conceptual and spatial contextual
aspects, should
not be confounded with the physical-semantic
distinction

Biederman et al. proposed.

The former distinction separates

Probability from Support, Interposi ti nn

,

size and Position

on the basis of differences in the source this
contextual

information is drawn from (i.e. the scene's conceptual

interpretation versus the scene's spatial layout).

The

latter distinction however, separates Support and Interposi-

tion from Probability, Size and Position on the basis of a

difference in the kinds of preliminary scene processing
required to use these relations as a basis for object identification.

Specifically, this distinction reflects the

fact that while object size and position can be encoded from
a scene prior to its semantic interpretation, they only

(like object probability) become distinctive object features

by virtue of the object's presence in a particular scene.
Consequently, this information requires a semantic inter-

pretation of the scene in order to be used as
object identification.

a basis for

As for support and interposition,

this is not the case since they are characteristic for any
object, no matter what scene it appears in.

As a result,

they merely need to be determined in a physical 3D-parse of
the scene in order to reveal the aspect of object identity

they carry information about (i.e. its fundamental physical
nature).

As will be explained below, Biederman et al.'s use
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Of this distinction plays a
crucial role in the theoretical
conclusions they have drawn from the
experiments which I
will discuss presently.

In these experiments (Biederman,

Mezzanotte,

&

1981; Biederman,

Rabinowitz, 1982), subjects were asked to

determine whether a pre-named

target object had been pre-

sent at a specific position in a tachistoscopically
pre-

sented line drawing of a scene.

Scenes were exposed for 150

msec and were followed by a mask containing a dot, which
indicated the position of the object the subject had to

decide about whether or not it was the pre-named target.

On

half of the trials the target did indeed appear at the cued

position while on the other half some other object was

presented there.

The variable of interest was the degree to

which the appearance of the object at the cued position conformed to the five object-context relations defined above.
In a Base condition the object violated none of its typical

relations to the scene it was presented in.

In various

Violation conditions however, one, two or three of five
possible infractions on these relations (i.e. the object
floated, passed through its background, was improbable, ap-

peared in an inappropriate position or size)

,

were intro-

duced.

According to Biederman et al., speed and accuracy of the
subject's responses in this experiment can be regarded as

measure of the perceptibility of the object at the cued

a

,
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position.

Consequently, they claim, the finding
of violation costs in any of the Violation
conditions (i.e.
a

decrease in response speed and accuracy
relative to the Base
condition) would indicate that the violated
relations con-

stitute part of the information normally
used in identifying
objects in scenes.

Against the background of this logic three main
results
have been obtained in these studies. First, all
manipulated

object-context relations appeared to provide contextual
information used for object identification in scenes since

violation costs were incurred for each one of them (with the
exception of Interposition which produced no violation costs
at all)

.

Second, as more pieces of misleading contextual

information were introduced, the perceptibility of the

object they pertained to decreased.

This was suggested by a

clear increase of miss rates and correct reaction times
along with a very slight but significant increase in false

alarm rates, as the number of simultaneous relational violations went up from zero to three.

Third, based on an in-

spection of the relative size of the violation costs in-

curred for the various types of violations, it was found
that

i)

with the exception of Interposition

textual information (i.e. Support

,

.

spatial con-

Size and Position

)

had at

least as much of an effect on object identification as

conceptual contextual information does (i.e. Probability

)

and ii) physical relations (i.e. Interposition and Support

)
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do not have a stronger effect
on object identification
than
semantic relations do (i.e. Probability,
size an
Position).

Much along the lines laid out by
Friedman (1979) and
Antes and Penland (1981), Biederman
and colleagues have
interpreted these results as indicating that

the first 150

ins

of scene viewing are sufficient to
activate a global

scene schema, which contains an integrated
representation of
both the conceptual and spatial structure of the
scene.

Based on this schema activation, object identity
hypotheses
are generated which are verified in the viewed scene
by

means of a search for the spatial and featural characteristics the schema specifies for each object it includes.

To

the extent that scene and schema information are compatible,

this will result in rapid and accurate object identification, while incompatibilities between them will cause the

object identification process to be slower and more
error-prone.
As was already pointed out, the evidence for effects of

spatial violations clearly seems to favor this theory over
an inter-object priming account of context effects on object

identification in scenes.

In addition, Biederman and col-

leagues claim that the effects of semantic violations cha-

racterize most prominent models of visual object perception
(e.g. Guzman,

1982; Waltz,

1969; Hoffman
1975)

&

Richards, 1985; Marr, 1978 and

as inadequate for modeling more than the

perception of un-anticipated, isolated objects.
ly,

Specifical-

they argue that these theories are flawed in their
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description of object perception
as exclusively based on the
data-driven and pre-conceptual recovery
of the object's

structural features from the image.

if this were indeed a

correct view, Biederman et al. point out,
one could perhaps
expect effects of the physical violations
since
they might

interfere with parsing the object from the image,
but one
certainly should not find effects of semantic
violations.

Since the results showed no effects of Interposition
and
only a small effect of Support while all the semantic
,

relations did produce substantial violation costs, they
conclude that bottom-up accounts of object perception should
be reserved for the rare cases in which object-context re-

lations are either inappropriate or absent.

While these conclusions may appear to be quite inevitable, it should be pointed out that there are a number
of problems associated with this research, which raise

serious doubts about their validity.
The main problem that should be mentioned is that the

response speed and accuracy recorded in this experiment may
not at all reflect the perceptibility of the object at the

cued position, but rather may measure the subject's degree
of uncertainty in post-perceptually deciding whether this

object could indeed have been the pre-named target object.
Specifically, what

I

want to argue is that a 100-150

masked exposure of

a

scene will frequently be insufficient

ras

to succeed in a data-driven recovery of the structural

.
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features of individual objects
from the image.
Consequently, if object identification is
primarily based on such
recovery, subjects in the Biederman
experiments will often
have to resort to educated guesses as
to whether cued and
pre-named objects were one and the same.

m

order to guide

these guesses, subjects not only have available
their
priori knowledge about the pre-named target, but
they

a

can

also be assumed to have at their disposal some
information
about the image they just saw. Specifically, as
Antes,

Penland, and Metzger (1981) and Antes, Mann, and Penland
(1981)

demonstrated, 100-150 ms scene exposures can be

sufficient to get some idea of the general theme or setting

depicted in the scene.

In addition, while detailed structu-

ral features of the cued object may not have been recovered

during the scene's exposure, this could be the case for some
of its gross spatial properties (i.e. relative size and

position in the scene) which have been shown to be encoded
very rapidly and prior to object identity (e.g Breitmeyer

&

Ganz, 1976; Kosslyn, 1987; Ungerleider

I

&

Mishkin, 1982).

should immediately point out that the relative size and

position

I

refer to, should not be confused with the seman-

tic object-context relations Size and Position which Bieder-

man et al. defined.

I

use these terms only to refer to

strictly pre-conceptually detectable object characteristics
(i.e. proportion of the scene's visual angle occupied by the

object, its distance to the scene's ground plane, its near-

ness and position relative to other objects)

.
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Based on a comparison between
these two types of contextual informa-tion and their a
priori knowledge about the
pre-named target object, subjects can in
my opinion generate
post-perceptual guesses about whether or not
the cued
and

pre-named object were the same, which will lead
to the
response patterns which Biederman and colleagues

interpreted

as reflecting variations in perceptibility of
the cued

object.

For the trials on which the target is present, this

post-perceptual comparison will namely produce evidence
against a "yes, the cued object was the target" response

whenever a violation of Probability
Support is introduced.

,

size

.

Position or

For instance, deriving the theme

"kitchen" from a scene will increase the subject's uncer-

tainty about deciding that some unidentified 'blob' in that
scene was a wheelbarrow.

An uncertainty which will increase

even further when the blob occupied only a small portion of
the scene, was located at a great distance of the scene's

ground plane and did not appear anywhere near to another

potentially support-providing surface.

Consequently, one

can expect that as more of these violations are introduced,

the subject's uncertainty will tend to grow and he will both

take more time to finally say "yes" and be less likely to

respond "yes" at all (resulting in the observed increase of
miss rates and correct reaction times as the number of

violations goes up)
However, for the trials on which not the target but some
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other object was present at the
cued location, a systematic
change in the subject's Base
condition uncertainty should
not be expected in the Violation
conditions.
On those
trials, the violations do not pertain
to the pre-named
target and a post-perceptual comparison
of contextual information and a priori target knowledge should
therefore be
largely non-informative and irrelevant to
task performance.
Consequently, what one would expect is an
essentially identical performance level for the catch trials
across

the Base

and Violation conditions.
(1982)

Note that Biederman et al.'s

finding of a very slight but significant increase
in

false alarm rates as more violations are introduced,
can

hardly be viewed as a serious argument for rejecting the
post-perceptual interpretation of the data in favor of an

exlanation in terms of object perceptibility.

Indeed, apart

from having failed to replicate this finding (Klatsky, Teitelbaum, Mezzanotte,

&

Biederman, 1981), Biederman and col-

leagues are equally unable to account for it since there is
no obvious reason why, within the framework of their theory,

one would expect subjects to be more likely to claim that an

object is a pre-named target as the object in question

becomes less perceptible.

It follows from this discussion that the post-perceptual

comparison explanation

I

proposed here, deals with the main

aspects of the Bieder-man data equally well as schema theory
does.

In fact, when we consider some of the more detailed
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results it turns out that it may
even be preferable.
A first argument to this effect is
that Biederman et al.
found that false alarm rates were
consistently higher for
catch trials on which the pre-named target
was probable to
appear in the scene, than for catch trials
on which

this was

not the case.

Obviously, this is completely in line with

the post-perceptual comparison hypothesis while
it poses
problems to the Biederman et al. interpretation.
Specifically, this finding implies that knowledge associated
with

the individual target named before scene exposure plays
an

important role in determining the subject's response.

The

question then becomes to what extent one can still maintain
that responses in this experiment reflect influences of

knowledge contained in a global scene schema activated
during the very first stages of scene viewing.
Secondly, there is the total absence of an effect of

Interposition violations.

Following the Biederman et al.

logic, this implies that a violation which thoroughly dis-

turbs an object's featural structure has no effect what-

soever on that object's perceptibility.

While one could

certainly argue, as Biederman does, that this only lends additional support to the notion that in scenes relational
object features play a much more important role in object

identification than structural object features do,

I

rather hesitant in accepting this interpretation.

The

feel

problem is that it presupposes that relational object features are generally sufficient to uniquely and correctly
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specify an object's identity,
which I think is at the least
a questionable assumption.
The post-perceptual explanation
however, predicts this absence of
Interposition effects
without assuming this. Specifically,
it

starts out from the

idea that 100-150 ms scene exposures
are generally insufficient to recover an object's featural
structure, which
logically entails that disturbances of
this structure should
have little effect on later decisions
concerning the object's identity.
I therefore see an additional
reason here
to be more favorable towards this explanation
of the Biederman et al. results.

A final problem that should be mentioned, concerns the
effects that were obtained for the multiple Violation
condition which included simultaneous violations of Probability
and Size.

Specifically, the problem is that in this condi-

tion violation costs were higher than those obtained for the
condition in which Probability only was violated.

Within

the framiework of Biederman et al.'s theory this is quite an

inexplicable finding since it implies that a global schema

pertaining to a specific scene contains knowledge about the
typical size relations that hold between that scene and all
objects that typically do not appear in it.

Obviously, this

is a rather unlikely situation and an alternative explana-

tion needs to be offered.

Clearly, the post-perceptual

comparison hypothesis is a plausible candidate here.
Indeed, even if apprehension of the scene's global theme

suggests that the target was improbable to be in it, sub-

34

jects will still be able to
deterraine whether the relative
visual angle occupied by the blob
at the cued position
conforms to what can be expected if
the target should be
placed in that particular scene.

Conclusion
Based on the above discussion of the
research by Biederman and colleagues, it appears safe to
conclude
that no

irrefutable evidence has been presented for the
theory that
spatial scene-structure has a perceptual effect
on object

identification in real-world scenes.

Consequently, the

Probability effect discussed in the first section of this
chapter thusfar appears to be the only reliable indication
of contextual effects on object identification.

Two alternative explanations have been offered for this

phenomenon

:

one centered around mandatory top-down influ-

ences originating in a rapidly activated global scene-specific schema; and one based on an automatic priming process

operating between individual representations of semantically
related objects, thus reducing thresholds for data-driven

pattern recognition and identification of primed objects in
the image.

While it was indicated that the latter explana-

tion seems to be preferable because of its greater simplicity and generality, a more direct test of its sufficiency as
an account of the Probability effect in scenes is clearly in

order.

Specifically, the remainder of this thesis will

focus on examining some possible
constraints on inter-object
priming which, if proven to be
essential to this process,
could serve as a basis for testing
its validity as a mechanism for explaining scene-context
effects on object identification.

CHAPTER

2

CONSTRAINTS ON INTER-OBJECT PRIMING

Based on the Henderson et al.

(1987,

1988)

studies, three

possible constraints on priming can be identified
which may
be relevant for determining the degree to which
priming
could play a central role in scene-context effects.

First, it is possible that priming, to put it in terms
of

Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) distinction, only affects

controlled and not automatic processing of the primed object.

Indeed, in all of the Henderson et al. experiments

the facilitory effect of a related prime was measured con-

tingent upon fixation (i.e. a period of primarily controlled
processing) of the primed object.

Even the indications of

facilitated extrafoveal processing found in the gaze durations for primed objects (Henderson et al., 1988), can be

regarded as an effect on controlled object processing, since
a period of selective extrafoveal attention to the primed

object is very likely to have preceded that object's fixation (Morrison, 1984)

.

This present limitation of priming

observations to cases of controlled object processing is

quite interesting since advocates of the schema-approach to
scene-context effects (e.g. Antes

&

Penland, 1981) have

argued that, due to their contextual facilitation, probable
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Objects in a scene may remain
entirely unattended and
still
can be identified through automatic
feature

detection.
One
Of the objectives of the present
research therefore was to

examine whether priming effects are
indeed constrained to
controlled object processing. This was
done
in order to

determine whether an investigation of the
perceptibility of
unattended objects in full scenes can be
instrumental
for

assessing the validity of a priming account
of object probability effects on object recognition.

A second possible constraint that will be examined
is the
apparent necessity for the prime itself to be subjected
to
controlled processing in order to have an effect on the

processing of related objects.

Using arrays of four iso-

lated objects, Henderson et al.

(1987)

found the decrease of

the first fixation duration on a target object to be strictly conditional upon the immediately preceding fixation of a

target-related object.

The mere presence of other tar-

get-related objects in the array yielded no such effect as
evidenced by the absence of a decrease in first fixation

duration when the target was either the first object to be
fixated in the display or was fixated following the fixation
of an unrelated object.

Additional support for this absence

of a 'display-consistency effect' was reported by Henderson

et al.

(1988) who found that an object's semantic related-

ness to the array it appeared in did not affect the amount
of benefit derived from its extrafoveal preview.
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AS was the case for the
first constraint, this apparent
dependency of prixning effects on
controlled prixne processing
suggests that priming may be
insufficient to account for
context effects in full scenes.
Specifically, if this
second constraint does indeed hold,
a strict priming view
would predict that the facilitation of
an object's processing in a scene should be a function
of its semantic relation
to the previously fixated object while
its relation to
the

rest of the scene should be of little
importance.

Concrete-

this would mean that no facilitation should
be expected
for probable objects which are fixated as the
first object
in a scene or are fixated following the fixation
ly,

of an

improbable object.

The first of these predictions runs

counter to the Klatsky, Teitelbaum, Mezzanotte, and Bieder-

man (1981) claim that a 100 ms scene exposure is sufficient
to produce facilitation for a probable object foveated

during that exposure.

The second prediction is contested by

the Antes and Penland (1981) suggestion that probable ob-

jects can be identified extraf oveally even when an im-

probable object is being fixated.

Clearly, if priming could

be demonstrated to be strictly conditional upon controlled

prime processing just prior to target processing, an unambiguous confirmation of these two claims would indicate the

insufficiency of inter-object priming as an account of
scene-context effects.

Taking into consideration that other

authors have claimed that priming can be initiated on the
basis of automatic prime processing (e.g. McCauley, Par-

melee. Sperber,

&

Carr, 1980), it therefore was
decided to

examine the reliability of the
Henderson et al.
failure to observe display-consistency

(1987,

1988)

effects.

The third possible constraint that
will be investigated
is more than likely the most
important
one.

Specifically,

probably the main objection which one could
formulate
against the idea that priming might underly

the facilitation

of probable objects in scenes, is that
the results presented

as proof for priming were obtained with
groups of objects

selected on the basis of their semantic relatedness.

Henderson et al.

(1987)

assume (and quite reasonably

While
I

think) that a probable object in a given scene is more

likely to be semantically related to the other objects in it

than is the case for an object which is improbable in that
scene, one can undoubtedly come up with an impressive list
of non-related objects which are likely to appear in the

same scene (e.g. a toilet and an electric razor in a bathroom, a fireplace and a television in a living-room, etc.).

In fact, as pointed out in the discussion of the Antes and

Penland (1981) experiment in the first chapter, it is not
impossible that the absence of facilitation for probable

objects in the Low Context condition of that study should be
interpreted as showing that the priming effect is indeed

strictly limited to objects that are clearly semantically
related.

Clearly, this suggests that an orthogonal manipu-

lation of an object's probability in a scene and its seman-

,
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tic relatedness to the other
objects in the scene could
provide the necessary data for
determing whether priming
Plays any role in object probability
effects in scenes,
order to establish whether this
would be a useful strategy,
a third objective of the present
research was to systematically examine the existence of priming
effects between
objects selected on the basis of their
common likelihood to
appear in a given scene, i.e. on the basis
of their episodic
relatedness

m

CHAPTER

3

EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

3

.

Experiment

1

3«1«1

1

Researc h objectives and app roanh

The main objectives of this experiment were to determine

whether inter-object priming could affect automatic processing of a primed object and if so, whether controlled pro-

cessing of the prime would be a necessary condition for this
effect to appear.

In other words, this experiment is an

attempt to establish whether the claim (Antes

&

Penland,

1981; Biederman et al., 1982) that identification of a

probable object in a full real-world scene is facilitated
regardless of whether it or other probable objects are

attended to, could in principle be explained as the result
of an inter-object priming mechanism.

To the best of my knowledge, only one study has been

reported which provides evidence that appears to be directly
relevant to these issues.

Specifically, in order to deter-

mine the relative ease with which global scene and individual object information are processed during the first
glance at a scene. Antes, Penland and Metzger (1981) measured accuracy of a target object's recognition in a forced
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Choice task following its 100 msec
presentation in either a
full scene (High Context) or in an
array of isolated objects
(Low Context)
By orthogonally manipulating the
probability
of appearance of target and distractors
in the
.

full scene,

Antes et al. were able to determine that in
the High Context
condition subjects primarily responded on the
basis of
the

scene's global theme (i.e. they showed a strong
tendency to
choose the objects with the highest likelihood of
appearance, regardless of whether they actually had been

present in the scene)

.

In the Low Context condition, res-

ponses appeared to be primarily based on what objects the
subjects had actually identified perceptually.

responses
condition,

(1)
(2)

That is,

were more accurate than in the High Context
showed a clear superiority for objects closer

to the central fixation point and

manipulation of likelihood.

(3)

were unaffected by the

It appears that two conclusions

can be drawn from these results.
First, it is suggested that the global theme of a scene

can be apprehended more quickly than the identity of the

individual objects in it.

While this finding certainly is

compatible with the claims advanced in schema-theories of
scene perception, it should be pointed out that it provides

insufficient grounds for assuming that individual object

perception in scenes is inevitably mediated by
derived global scene interpretation.
(1969)

a

quickly

Following the Reicher

and Wheeler (1970) rationale this could only have

been inferred from the Antes et al.

(1981)

data if recogni-
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tion accuracy of probable targets
among equally probable
distractors had been significantly
better than recognition
accuracy of improbable targets among
equally improbable
distractors. while the Antes et al. data

appear to indicate

that this was indeed the case, it should
be noted that the
recognition accuracy for improbable targets
among improbable
distractors was significantly below chance-level
performance
which shows major problems in the selection of
distractors
for this task.

Clearly, this makes it impossible to inter-

pret these data as reliable evidence for a genuine contextual facilitation of the perception of probable objects
in scenes.

Second, and more relevant to the present discussion, the

data obtained in the Antes et al. study suggest that here we

may have the prototype of a paradigm which allows for an
assessment of the effects of priming on automatic object
processing.

Specifically, what is of interest here is that

accuracy of object recognition in the forced choice task

varied as a function of factors affecting the perceptibility
of the target object -i.e. degree of lateral masking and

visual acuity-.

This is indicated by the fact that it was

higher for isolated targets than for targets presented in
scenes, and also higher for targets presented closer to the

central fixation point.

The reason why this is interesting

is that these effects surfaced following the 100 ms presen-

tation of an uncued target at an unspecified and generally
extrafoveal position.

Under these conditions one can rea-
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sonably assume that subjects
generally did not succeed
selectively attending to the target
during its exposure and
therefore could not engage in its
controlled

m

processing.

This then leads to the conclusion
that the object recognition accuracy recorded here is sensitive
to genuine perceptual differences in the ease with which
object information
is acquired through automatic processing,
and therefore
is

well-suited to measure priming effects on this
kind of
processing.
In fact, it could appear as if the Antes et
al.

(1981)

data for the Low Context condition are already
sufficient to
conclude that inter- object priming does not affect
automa-

tic object processing since no differences in recognition

accuracy for probable and improbable objects were found in
that condition.

However, there are two aspects of this

study which make it impossible to draw this conclusion.
First, all the objects used to construct the Low Context

stimuli were selected on the basis of episodic rather than

semantic relatedness.

Obviously, this leads to the problem

that there is no way of determining whether the absence of

a

difference between probable and improbable objects should be
interpreted as showing that priming only works between

semantically related objects or simply does not apply to
automatic object processing.

Second, the interpretational

problems are even further enhanced when one considers the
fact that there was no systematic manipulation of the infor-

mation appearing in foveal vision during the target's ex-
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trafoveal presentation.

Consequently, it is possible that

the third possible constraint on inter object
priming (i.e.
that it requires controlled processing of the prime)
was

violated as well, which makes it even more difficult
to use
the Low Context data as a basis for determing whether or

not

priming has any effect on automatic object processing.

Against the background of this analysis of the Antes et
al.

experiment, it was decided to use a modified

(1981)

version of their paradigm in order to study the role of
inter-object priming in automatic object processing.

Speci-

fically, subjects were confronted with a 150 ms, masked

presentation of an array of isolated objects and were then
asked to indicate which one of a set of four objects had
been present in the display.

contained

5

or

6

The presented arrays always

objects which could be grouped into two

different "episodic categories", i.e. object groups defined
by the common likelihood of their members to appear in the

same scene.

The two categories instantiated in each display

were always selected so that the overlap between them could
be considered to be minimal, i.e. objects selected for their

high likelihood to appear in the one scene were quite unlikely to also be encountered in the other scene.

Within this basic stimulus structure, two crucial manipulations were introduced.

The first manipulation concerned

the nature of the foveal information present while the to-

be-recognized object (henceforth called the target) was
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presented extraf oveally

m

.

the first type of display

("Foveal Related" conditions) the
foveal object was fro. the
same category the target belonged to;
in the second type
("Foveal Unrelated" conditions) the foveal
object belonged
to the other category instantiated in
the array; and in the
third type ("Foveal Absent" conditions) no
foveal object was
present at all. The second manipulation pertained
to the
nature of the extrafoveal information present
during display

exposure.

Specifically, by varying the number of target-

related extrafoveal objects in the arrays, several levels
of
"Extrafoveal Relatedness" were created. The rationale
behind these manipulations was as follows.

First, it was assumed that a comparison of the accuracy

with which the briefly and extraf oveally presented targets
were recognized in the

Foveal Related and Unrelated condi-

tions, should provide information about whether controlled

prime processing can facilitate automatic processing of

a

related object. Specifically, if this would indeed be the
case the target should be recognized more accurately in the
Foveal Related conditions.

(Note

1)

Second, since the experiment also aimed at examining

possible effects of automatic prime processing

,

it was

decided to compare target recognition performance across
levels of Extrafoveal Relatedness in Foveal Absent arrays.

Finding an increase in target recognition accuracy as Ex-

trafoveal Relatedness in these arrays increases, would

.
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Obviously constitute strong evidence
for the sufficiency of
automatic prime processing to
initiate priming effects,
unfortunately, however, the absence
of such an increase

would not allow for an equally clear
interpretation since at
least three explanations could be
suggested for it.
First,

automatic prime processing may elicit no
priming effects.
Second, automatic prime processing may
only

have an effect

conditional upon simultaneous controlled processing
of
another prime.
In other words, the presence of

unattended,

extrafoveal primes may only have an effect if their
per-

ceptibility is enhanced by the identification of a foveal
prime.

Note that this kind of secondary priming by un-

attended primes has already been suggested in research on
sentence processing (Paap

&

Newsome, 1981)

.

Third, auto-

matic prime processing could by itself be sufficient to
elicit priming, but the total absence of foveal load in the
Foveal Absent arrays could provide subjects with such a

high-quality extrafoveal target preview that priming may not
provide any additional benefit

(a

phenomenon already ob-

served in the naming latency experiments reported by Henderson et al.

,

1987)

In order to unravel these possible interpretational

problems, a third analysis was planned which involved a

comparison of Foveal Related-Unrelated differences in target

recognition performance at different levels of Extrafoveal
Relatedness.

Specifically, if this difference could be

demonstrated to increase when Extrafoveal Relatedness in the
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Foveal Related condition is
increased while that in the
Foveal Unrelated condition is
decreased, a facilitory effect
of the presence of unattended
primes would

m

be indicated,

addition, if this increased difference
would prove to be the
combined result of an increase in target
recognition in the
Foveal Related condition and a decrease
in the Foveal Unrelated condition, automatic prime processing
would appear to
be self-sufficient to elicit priming.
Alternatively,

if the

increased difference would be attributable to a
target

recognition increase in the Foveal Related condition
only

,

unattended prime effects would prove to be conditional
upon
simultaneous foveal prime processing.

To conclude this general description of the experiment, a
few final comments should be made with regard to the em-

ployed measure of target perceptibility.
In order to minimize the possibility for subjects to

selectively attend to the target during its presentation,
targets were uncued and were presented for only 150 ms at an
a priori unspecified extrafoveal location in an array of

objects.
(1981)

In addition (and contrary to the Antes et al.

experimental situation), each display was followed by

a visual noise mask to prevent subjects from using CRT

after-images or iconic memory to turn their attention to
specific extrafoveal objects in the display.

This was an

important control since there are indications (Loftus

&

Mackworth, 1978; Antes et al., 1981) that attention tends to
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shift very rapidly towards
objects that are episodically
unrelated to the scene or array of
objects they appear in.
In the present experiment this
would systematically favor
perceptual processing of the extrafoveal
objects belonging
to the least represented episodic
category in the
display,

and thus would obscure any possible priming
effects produced
by the manipulations of target-display
consistency and
foveal information. While the 150 ms exposure
duration was
assumed to be sufficiently short in order to avoid
atten-

tional shifts during stimulus presentation, the
presence of
both a CRT after-image and an undisturbed iconic
representation of the stimulus could allow for such shifts following
stimulus presentation, which is why the mask was introduced.
Finally, following the mask, subjects were presented with
a set of four object names from which they had to select the

target.
(1981)

Contrary, to what was the case in the Antes et al.

experiment, the distractors in this set always be-

longed to the same episodic category the target belonged to.

This was done in order to ensure that responses would indeed

reflect the perceptibility of individual targets rather than
a general judgment about which episodic category had been

represented in the display.
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3.1.2

Method

Subjects
16 members of the University of Massachusetts
subject

pool participated in the experiment.

All of the subjects

had normal vision and did not require
corrective lenses for
reading.

Stimuli
To construct the necessary object arrays, 12 3 line

drawings of different objects were used.

A large number of

these objects was drawn from the standardized set provided
by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). From this pool, 32

episodic categories of five objects each were assembled and

divided into 16 pairs of non-overlapping categories.

In

each of the resulting 16 groups of ten objects, two objects
(one from each category) were designated to be extrafoveal

targets, two others (one from each category) were selected

to serve as foveal primes, and the remaining six were

assigned the role of extrafoveal primes.

Where norms were

available, targets, foveal and extrafoveal primes from the

two categories in a given pair were selected to be of com-

parable visual complexity.

A complete list of the 16 cate-

gory-pairs is provided in Appendix A.
From each of these 16 pairs, eight different displays

were constructed as schematically illustrated in Table

1.
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Table

1.

Schematic representation of
structure and content
display types. Al through Af
and
Bl ^hr^'^rS^^^
through B5 denote different objects,
with
object'
°'
leJ?er'^nr:^"^"^^P
letter and the role of the object indicated by the
(target fovea!
prime or extrafoveal prime) indicated
by the

DISPLAY la

A3

DISPLAY lb

B3

A3

A2

B3

DISPLAY la'

DISPLAY lb'

A3

A3

33

33

B2

Bl

84

Bl

A4

Bl

34

Bl

A4

Al

Al

Al

DISPLAY 2a

DISPLAY 2b

DISPLAY 2a'

DISPLAY 2b'

A3

B5

A3

A5

B5

A2
Bl

A5

33

B2

A4

Bl

Al

In Table

B3

Al

34

Bl

Al

1,

A4

Bl

Al

34
Al

alphanumerical combinations "Al" through "A5"

and "Bl" through "B5" represent ten different objects be-

longing to two episodic categories "A" and "B".

The numbers

in these symbols indicate the role that was a priori

assigned to the object in question

:

"1" for targets,

"2"

for foveal primes and "3" through "5" for extrafoveal

primes.

As seen in Table

1,

the basic display structure consisted

of two targets and three extrafoveal primes placed on the
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corners of an imaginary pentagon.

in this manner

inter-Object and object-to-center of
display distance was
kept constant in order to (given the
subject's fixation on
the display center) equate all objects
for lateral masking
and visual acuity effects, within a given
pair of episodic
categories, targets always appeared at the
same location

in

order to maximize comparibility of the target's
accuracy of
recognition across display types. Across the 16
category-

pairs, however, targets were rotated through all
peripheral

positions in order to ensure that the subjects would not
be
able to generate expectations about target positions.

Within the framework of this basic display structure the
nature of the foveal information present at exposure time as

well as the number of extrafoveal primes were manipulated in
order to test the hypotheses outlined in section 3.1.1.

Displays la, lb, 2a and 2b were constructed to examine
Foveal Related-Unrelated differences in target percep-

tibility at various levels of Extrafoveal Relatedness.
Specifically, in displays la and lb, the two targets (Al and
Bl) were presented in a Foveal Related condition (la for Al

and lb for Bl) and a Foveal Unrelated condition (lb for Al
and la for Bl) with a similar, low Extrafoveal Relatedness
in both cases (i.e. one extrafoveal prime in the Foveal

Related condition and two in the Foveal Unrelated condition)

.

In displays 2a and 2b, the number of extrafoveal

.
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primes was increased from one
to three in the Foveal Related
condition (2a for Al and 2b for Bl)
while it was decreased
from two to zero in the Foveal
Unrelated condition (2a for
Bl and 2b for Al)
,

Displays la', lb', 2a' and 2b' were
constructed to examine whether unattended prime processing
could by itself

affect target perceptibility.

By simply removing the cen-

tral objects in displays la, lb, 2a and 2b,
these displays
presented the targets at four levels of Extrafoveal
Relatedness.
In increasing order of relatedness: displays
2b',

la',
la'

lb'

and 2a' for the A-target, and displays 2a', lb',

and 2b' for the B-target.
In this manner, the eight display types represented in

Table

1

produced eight context conditions in which to be

recognized targets were presented.

Table

2

summarizes how

the display types map onto the context conditions for the A
and B-targets.

In order to measure target perceptibility in these eight

context conditions, a choice set of four object names was
assembled for each of the 32 targets used in the experiment.
In addition to the name of the target itself, this set

contained the names of three other objects that did not
appear in the display the target was presented in, but did

belong to the same episodic category the target was a member
of.

A complete list of these choice sets is provided in

Appendix

B.
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Table

2.

^'^''^'^^

0 to 3).
Display ?ypes (see
^^^^ context condition are
TnH^^.i^
indicated for A and B-targets separately.

?ab?f ?^

FOVEAL RELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

1

FOVEAL UNRELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

2

FOVEAL RELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

3

FOVEAL UNRFT

ATFTi

EXTRAFOVEAL 0

A-taraets
- display la

A-taraets
- display lb

A-taraets
- display 2a

A-taraets
- display 2b

B-taraets
- display lb

B-taraets
- display la

B-taraets
- display 2b

B-taraets
- display 2a

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

EXTRAFOVEAL 0

EXTRAFOVEAL

EXTRAFOVEAL

EXTRAFOVEAL

A-taraets
- display 2b'

A-taraets
- display la'

A-taraets
- display lb'

A-taraets
- display 2a'

B-taraets
- display 2a'

B-taraets
- display lb'

B-taraets
-display la'

B-taraets
- display 2b'

:

:

1

:

:

2

:

:

3

:

:

Finally, in addition to the experimental stimuli, 24 more

arrays of six objects each were constructed to serve as

practice and filler stimuli.

While the spatial structure of

these displays was identical to that of the experimental
stimuli, the six objects in them always belonged to six

different episodic categories and the objects designated as
targets were always located in the center of the display.

There were two reasons for introducing these arrays as
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practice and filler stimuli.

First, their categorical

heterogeneity could help to discourage
subjects from responding on the basis of general categorical
display-consistency impressions instead of on whether or
not they

actually

saw any of the choice alternatives.

Second, the central

location of the targets in them could keep the
subjects from
adopting the strategy of covertly shifting their
attention
to the peripheral regions of the displays while
neglecting

the central area (which would obviously defeat the purpose
of the experiment)

.

Complete lists of these practice and

filler stimuli and their corresponding sets of choice alter-

natives are provided in Appendices C and

D.

Apparatus
The object pictures and the mask were entered into a

Hewlett-Packard 2100 computer by means of a Summagraphics
Bit-Pad, and were displayed on a Hewlett-Packard 1300A CRT

with a P-31 phosphor.
pictures subtended from

Over the entire set of objects,
1*>

to 3® both horizontally and ver-

tically, while the mask subtended 4® by 4®.

Inter-object

distance (measured from center to center) and
object-to-display center distance were approximately

6**.

The sets of four object names presented as alternatives in
the forced choice target recognition task, were also dis-

played on the CRT (one below the other)

,

with the target

name's position rotated through the list across trials.
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Procedurf>

Upon arrival, subjects were seated
46 cm from the CRT
with their head held in position by a
chin and forehead rest
in order to keep viewing distance
constant and eliminate
head movements.

Subjects were told that they would see
a

series of brief presentations of object groups,
which all
would be followed immediately by the presentation

of a set

of four object names.

One of these names, they were told,

would always correspond to an object that had actually been
present in the display they just saw, while the other three

would not.

Their task then was to pick out the name of the

object that had indeed been in the display. Each subject

received a total of 56 trials

:

4

practice trials and 32

experimental trials with the 20 filler trials inserted at
fixed positions between them.

Each trial consisted of the

following events: First, a cross was presented in the center
of the display and the subjects were instructed to fixate
it.

ms,

Subsequently, an array of objects was displayed for 150

immediately followed by a 250 ms presentation of the

mask at each of the locations where an object had just
appeared. Following the offset of the mask, a set of object

names were displayed as choice alternatives and the subject's choice was recorded by the experimenter.

No feedback

was given before the end of the experiment which lasted 15
to 20 minutes.
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Design
As pointed out above, the measure
of interest in this
experiment was the accuracy of target
recognition in each of
the eight context conditions presented in
Table 2. Two
restrictions had to be taken into account in
obtaining
this

measure.

The first one was that subjects could not be

presented with the same array of objects more than once,
since previous research on the effects of extrafoveal

primes

(Paap & Newsome, 1981) showed these effects to be a function

of the subject's familiarity with the stimuli.

The second

one was that subjects could not be presented with the same
set of choice alternatives more than once, in order to avoid

effects of response strategies (e.g. a subject could attempt
to show consistency by always choosing the same alternative

regardless of whether or not he actually saw
of these

it)

.

In view

restrictions, it was impossible to present each

subject with the 256 trials (16 pairs of episodic object-

categories X

2

sets of choice alternatives for each of these

category-pairs X
pair)

,

8

different displays for each category-

which were required to probe all targets in all

context conditions.

Obviously, this ruled out the pos-

sibility of measuring accuracy of target recognition in
terms of the number of subjects that correctly recognized a

particular target in a particular context condition.

It was

therefore decided to measure accuracy of target recognition
for a particular context condition in terms of the number of

targets in that condition that had been correctly recognized
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across subjects.
in order to do so, the 16 types
of target recognition
trials (which were produced by the
combination of two sets
of choice alternatives with eight
different displays for
each category-pair) were grouped into eight
pairs of maxi-

mally discrepant target recognition trials.

Specifically,

the two trials in each pair always differed in
terms of the
target that was probed for (the A-target in one
trial and
the B-target in the other)
the foveal content of the dis,

play presented during the trial

(a

foveal object was present

on one trial and absent in the other)

,

and the identity of

the non-target objects in the display (only one of these

objects was the same in the two trials)

.

By assigning the

eight trial-pairs for a given category-pair to

8

different

subjects, and repeating this procedure for all 16 category-

pairs (with the restriction that across category-pairs each
subject should receive all types of target recognition tasks

equally often)

,

each subject was assigned a series of 32

trials (individually randomized for each subject)

,

while

across subjects all 32 targets were probed once in each of
the

8

context conditions.

Since 16 subjects participated in

the experiment, the whole procedure could be replicated and
64 data-points

(i.e. two for each target) were available to

compute the proportion correct in each of the eight context
conditions.

59

3.1.3

Result;

A first result that needs to be
mentioned is that on the
20 filler trials (where the target was
located in the center
of the display) all subjects performed
at a very high level
of accuracy
proportion correct ranged from .75 to
l.oo
:

with an average of .85 (chance-level
performance being .25).
Clearly, this suggests that subjects were
unlikely to have
adopted a systematic strategy of shifting their
attention to
the peripheral regions of the displays, which
would have run
counter to the objectives of the experiment.
The results pertaining to the accuracy of target
recogni-

tion in the eight context conditions, are presented in
Table
3.

Table

3.

Proportion of targets correct per Context
condition.

FOVEAL RELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

1

(I)

FOVEAL UNRELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

2

(II)

.250

FOVEAL RELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL

3

(III)

.343

FOVEAL UNRELATED

EXTRAFOVEAL 0
(IV)

.265

.406

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

FOVEAL ABSENT

EXTRAFOVEAL 0

EXTRAFOVEAL

EXTRAFOVEAL

EXTRAFOVEAL

(VI)

(V)

.421

1

(VIII)

(VII)

.437

2

.390

.406

3
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The first thing to note
here is that the comparison
between the Foveal Related
(I and III) and
Unrelated (ii and
IV) conditions does not
show superior target
recognition

performance in the former, as
would be expected if controlled prime processing
facilitated automatic perceptual

processing of related objects.

m

fact, the difference was

clearly in the opposite direction
since the overall proportion correct in the Foveal Related
conditions (i.e. .257) is
significantly smaller [Z = 2.01,
p < .05] than that in the
Foveal Unrelated conditions (i.e.
.374).

Contrary to this clear indication of an,
albeit unexpected, Foveal Relatedness effect on
target recognition
performance, no such indication appears to be
present for an
Extrafoveal Relatedness effect. In the data for the
Foveal
Absent conditions (proportions V through VIII), no
signi-

ficant differences could be found in the six possible
pair-

wise comparisons between these conditions.

Obviously, this

finding does not support the hypothesis that unattended

prime processing can by itself facilitate automatic processing of a related object.

As mentioned before, however, a

null-effect in these comparisons does not necessarily mean
that Extrafoveal Relatedness can play no facilitory role at
all conditional upon simultaneous Foveal Relatedness and/or
the absence of a high-quality extrafoveal target preview.
Since, however, an insignificant superiority of Foveal Unre-

lated over Foveal Related (i.e. proportion II minus proper-
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tion

I,

z

= 1.157, E > .05)

further increases to reach
significance (i.e. proportion
IV xninus proportion

in,

z =

1.718, E < .05) When Extrafoveal
Relatedness is decreased in
the Foveal Unrelated condition
while it is increased in
the

Foveal Related condition, the
data quite clearly argue
against any facilitory effect of
unattended primes on automatic processing of related objects.
To the contrary, the
data for the Foveal Unrelated
conditions show a tendency for
performance to decrease as Extrafoveal
Relatedness
in-

creases.

While this tendency does not reach
significance
(proportion IV minus proportion II, z =
.739, p > .05) it is
interesting to note that it is consistent
with a similar
tendency in the Foveal Absent conditions.
Only in the

Foveal Related conditions this pattern did not
surface,
which could very well be due to a floor-effect

since perfor-

mance in these conditions dropped entirely to
chance-level.
Note that this minimal level of performance was only
found

in the Foveal Related conditions, while recognition
accuracy
in all other conditions was significantly higher than

chance-level

(a

proportion correct of .338 being sufficient

to reach a .05 significance level).

3.1.4

Discussion

The first conclusion that can be drawn from the data

presented here

is that neither controlled nor automatic

.
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processing of individual objects
appear to facilitate
pre-attentive processing of other objects
likely to appear in
the

same real-world scene.

This follows from the failure
to
find either l) superior target
recognition in the Foveal
Related versus Unrelated conditions,
or 2) an increase in
performance as the degree of Extrafoveal
Relatedness increases. Naturally, these data do
not necessarily imply
that the inter-object priming mechanism
observed in previous
studies (e.g. Carr, McCauley, Sperber,
& Parmelee, 1982;

Henderson et al. 1987; Reinitz, Wright,

&

Loftus, 1989) is

restricted to controlled processing of the
target object.
In order to draw this conclusion, one
would have
to be

certain that the absence of facilitory priming
effects in
the present experiment was not due to the

operationalisation

of prime-target relatedness in terms of episodic
rather than

semantic relatedness.

However, the data do imply that if

ease of pre-attentive object processing in full scenes could
be demonstrated to be enhanced by the object's likelihood of

appearance in the scene, inter-object priming would provide
an insufficient basis to account for this effect of scene

context

The most intriguing aspect of the data however, is not
the failure to find facilitation of targets related to
foveal or extrafoveal primes, but the apparent superiority
of recognition for targets which were not related to these

primes.
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A first explanation one
could propose for this
phenomenon
is based on the proposition
that the featural dissimilarity
between the target and the other
objects is greater when
they do not belong to the same
episodic
object category.

Analagous to what a number of authors
have suggested for
semantically related objects (e.g. Carr
et al.,

Huttenlocher

&

1982;

Kubicek, 1983; Sperber, McCauley,
Ragain,

&

Weil, 1979), Biederman (1981) obtained
some results indicating that episodically related objects
are visually more
alike than unrelated objects. Specifically,
Biederman asked
subjects to determine whether a pre-named
target object was

present in a briefly exposed (100 ms) array of
extraf oveally
located objects. False alarm rates in this task
were lower

and unaffected by the number of objects in the
display only
when the target did not belong to the episodic category
all

the other objects in the display belonged to.

Miss rates

however, were similar for both display-consistent and incon-

sistent targets and increased as the number of objects in
the display increased.

While Biederman initially inter-

preted these data as evidence for

a categorical pop-out

effect -similar to what Egeth, Jonides, and Wall (1972)
found for letters and digits- he later (Biederman, 1982)

stated that they should rather be seen as indicating that
objects from the same episodic category are visually more
alike and therefore more confusable than objects from different categories.

In view of these results, one could

argue that in the present experiment, a greater featural
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dissimilarity between unrelated
targets and the other objects may have enhanced their
visual
distinctiveness.

As a
result, their perceptibility and
subsequent accuracy of
recognition could have increased directly
by making their
features stick out in the visual field,
or indirectly by
eliciting pre-saccadic shifts of attention
towards these
visually distinct objects.

However, two aspects of the data suggest
that this explanation is not quite complete. First, while
there was a

slight tendency for a decrease in performance
as Extrafoveal
Relatedness (i.e the number of extrafoveal primes)
in-

creased, it never reached the level of significance
that

would have corroborated the visual dissimilarity hypothesis.
Second, adding a target-related object in the center of a

display did not produce a graceful degradation of target
recognition performance for that display, as one would
expect if the foveal prime would constitute just another
source of visual target-distractor conf usability

.

Rather,

it caused performance to completely drop to chance-level,

which could not be ascribed to an increase in foveal load
(Ikeda

&

Takeuchi, 1975) since the phenomenon did not occur

when a target-unrelated foveal object was added.
In view of these considerations, it appears to be more

adequate to explain the unrelated target superiority by
assuming that when an object's representation is sufficiently strongly activated, it will prime the representations of

other objects belonging to the same episodic category.

If
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one further assumes, that
T:nat ciii/-k
such strong activation of
a single
Object representation and the
resulting priming of related
,

representations can only be achieved
on the basis of controlled object processing, the
observed
results can be

explained.

Specifically, the chance-level
performance for
foveal-related targets can be attributed
to insufficiently
large differences in the level of
representational activation between foveal-related objects
that were actually in
the display and primed objects that
were not.
Indeed, this
would result in a set of possible response
candidates
for

the subsequent forced choice task, which
would include the
entire set of response alternatives and
therefore would
necessitate the subject to choose at random. For
the fo-

veal-unrelated targets, this kind of priming and response
competition between target-related objects should not be
expected if the assumption is correct that controlled object

processing is required for such effects to appear.

The

absence of a clear effect of Extrafoveal Relatedness supports this assumption and suggests that the slight tendency

towards such an effect in the Foveal Unrelated and Foveal

Absent conditions, may in fact be attributable to the identification of (and subsequent priming by) extrafoveal tar-

get-related objects on a small proportion of the trials.

In conclusion, the present data are taken to, albeit

indirectly, suggest that inter-object priming is not limited
to semantically related objects but also occurs between
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episodically related objects.

However, the results also

indicate that if such pricing
exists, it does not facilitate
pre-attentive processing of primed
objects.
This clearly
suggests an approach for unambiguously
testing the validity
of inter-object priming as a
complete account of effects
of
object probability in full scene
context.

3

.

2

3.2.1

Experiment

9

Research Objectives and Approach

The first objective of this experiment was
to further
explore the superior recognition of unrelated
targets in the
Foveal Present conditions in Experiment 1. Specifically,
the question was examined whether this finding
reflected a

greater perceptibility of these targets or rather should, as

proposed in the discussion of Experiment

1,

be interpreted

as indirect evidence for the operation of a priming process

between episodically related objects.
As mentioned before, the absence of systematic effects of

Extrafoveal Relatedness in the first experiment argued

against the hypothesis that a 'pop-out' effect based on
categorical (Egeth et al., 1972) or featural (Biederman,
1982) dissimilarity could have directly enhanced the per-

ceptibility of the unrelated targets.

However, one could

still stress the point that the unrelated target recognition

67

was only significantly superior in the displays
containing
no other target-related objects (i.e proportion IV
in Table
Consequently, under the assumption that objects
3).
from

different episodic categories do indeed tend to be more

visually dissimilar, one could argue that this indicates
the
possibility of a pre-saccadic attentional shift towards
those elements in the periphery of the display which are

visually most dissimilar to the information processed foveally.

On this view, one would indeed expect the unrelated

targets to be recognized most accurately in displays in

which such an attentional shift would systematically be
directed towards them, i.e. in the displays in which all
other peripheral objects are related to the foveal object.
In order to determine the validity of this alternative

explanation of the unrelated target superiority, it was

decided to examine one of its possible implications in the
present experiment.

Specifically, if featural dissimilarity

between the object in foveal vision and a peripherally
located object were indeed to draw the subjects' attention,
one could expect this attentional shift to be followed by a

saccade towards this dissimilar object.

In fact, research

by Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Antes and Penland (1981) and

Antes et al.

(1981)

does indeed suggest that both in full

scenes and in arrays of isolated objects, peripherally
located objects tend to be fixated earlier in the course of

display exploration when they are episodically unrelated
(and hence featurally dissimilar) to the objects foveated
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during the first fixations
on the center of the display,
consequently, it appeared to
be worthwile to examine
the
scanning patterns of subjects
confronted with the Foveal
Present stimuli of Experiment
1, in order
to determine

Whether the unrelated target superiority
observed for these
stimuli could be attributed to covert
attentional shifts

towards these targets.

Clearly, if this analysis of scanning
patterns should
reveal that unrelated objects in the periphery
of the displays tend to be fixated earlier, the
related-unrelated

differences in Experiment

1

could no longer be interpreted

as a result of response competition caused by
a priming

process between episodically related objects.
the second objective of Experiment

2

Therefore,

was to more directly

examine the existence of such priming by using a measure

generally believed to directly reflect ease of object identification (i.e the duration of the first fixation on an
object)

.

Obviously, a decrease in first fixation duration

for a given target object following the fixation of an

episodically related object would lend support to the notion
of a priming process between these objects.
In addition, first fixation duration for targets can also

be analyzed as a function of the simultaneous presence of

other target-related objects which are not attended to prior
to the targets' fixation.

In this manner, it can be es-

tablished whether the failure for automatic prime processing
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to facilitate target
i^gei: reo
nrrr.
recognition
^-

m

Experiment 1, should be
attributed to the pre-attentive
nature of the prime processing or of the target
processing in that task. The
primary reason for examining
this question was that
its
answer can provide yet another
step towards identifying
the
kind Of research that is most likely
to yield unambiguous
conclusions with regard to the validity
of
an inter- object

priming explanation of probability
effects on object perception in scenes. Specifically, if
the

presence of unattended

primes would have no influence on first
fixation durations
for the targets, then a priming account
of

object probabili-

ty effects in scenes would be clearly
falsified by any
effects that are not exclusively attributable
to the episodic relation between the target and the object
fixated just

prior to it.

in other words, this would lead to the very

concrete prediction that no facilitation should be
found for
probable targets fixated as the first object in a scene, or
for probable targets fixated after attending to an im-

probable object.
It may seem that the last question examined in the pre-

sent experiment has already been answered in the Henderson
et al.

(1987,

1988)

studies where global target-display

consistency failed to have an effect on the duration of
first target fixations.

There is one important reason,

however, why these data do not conclusively rule out the

possibility of an effect of automatic prime processing.
Specifically, as Henderson et al.

(1988)

already mentioned,
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an effect of automat
ir- r»>--ii««
ui-omaric
prime ^
processing presupposes that
visual attention can be unfocused
to such an extent that
Object information can be
extracted across the entire
display. AS Loftus (1983) argues,
this widely distributed
attention may well be a typical
characteristic of the first
fixation (s) on a scene, allowing for
the detection of some
object features and their spatial
locations. While this
proposition finds some support in the cited
evidence for

very rapidly occuring systematic saccades
towards peripherally located inconsistent objects,
Henderson et al. (1988)
argue that their data favor an alternative
model of visual
attention.
Specifically, while they did find
indications

for an extrafoveal preview benefit for targets
fixated

following the fixation of a related object, no such
benefit
was observed when the target was related to all the
objects

in the display except the one fixated just prior to it.

Consequently, they claim, a sequential model of visual

attention seems more appropriate, according to which attention is only directed towards the position currently being

fixated and the one about to be fixated.
The question which can be raised, however, is whether Hen-

derson et al. did not induce their subjects to distribute
their attention in such a sequential fashion, by imposing a
standard fixation sequence of objects appearing at fixed

positions in displays terminated by the subjects themselves.
It appears to be a reasonable assumption that under these

conditions, there is no need for a wide distribution of at-
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tention and consequently
little reason to expect targetdisplay consistency effects,
a fairer test for the possible
existence of effects of automatic
prime processing therefore
was required, in which task
conditions explicitly
favored a

wide distribution of attention.

In order to examine these questions
a modified version of
the paradigm employed in Experiment 1
was used. Using

similar arrays of isolated objects, subjects
now were allowed to move their eyes away from the center

of the display

and fixate one of the peripheral objects.

Displays were

terminated and the mask and forced choice task were
presented once a peripheral object had received a first
fixation,
or if no such fixation had occurred after

1

sec of exposure.

These exposure time constraints were imposed in order to
induce the subjects to actually move their eyes away from
the display center to the peripheral objects,

in addition,

they forced subjects to gather spatially disparate information and make a fixation decision in a limited amount of
time, thus favoring an initially wide distribution of atten-

tion.

During the entire exposure duration of the displays,

eye movement patterns were recorded in order to control

display termination and collect the necessary data for
testing the hypotheses outlined above.
Specifically, scanning patterns across displays with a

central object should reveal whether peripheral objects

which are not episodically related to that object are selec-

72

ted for fixation more freauentiv
^i-equentiy, as
=.0
can be expected if
their presumably greater
auer reatural
feai-nr-^i dissimilarity
1 ^
to the
central object does indeed
attract
•

attention,
in addition, average first
fixation durations for the
selected targets should be shorter
when they are Central
Related
if priming between episodically
related objects does indeed
exist.
Finally, if pre-attentive object
processing can also
cause such a priming effect, then
this should become ap-

parent in a decrease of first target
fixation durations with
an increase in Peripheral Relatedness,
i.e.
in the number of

target-related objects in the periphery of
the display.

3.2.2

Method

Subjects
Eight members of the University of Massachusetts subject
pool participated in the experiment.

All of the subjects

were familiar with the eye movement registration equipment

used in the experiment and none of them required corrective
lenses for reading.

Stimuli
The stimuli used in this experiment were identical to
those in Experiment

1

except for two minor modifications

which were introduced in order to be able to reliably analyze the fixation duration data.
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specifically, because
fixation durations tend to
vary
considerably across individuals
(Rayner, 1978), it was
decided to run a completely
within-subjects design in
order
to control for the variance
due to these interindividual
differences.
since this necessarily
implies longer experimental sessions per subject,
display types laand lb-

(see

Table

1) were omitted in order to
shorten the experiment.
This had no further implications
because the sole purpose of
these display types was to provide
intermediate levels

of

Peripheral Relatedness.

Consequently, display types 2a.
and

2b', providing extreme levels of
Peripheral Relatedness,

were sufficient to test the hypothesis
that automatic prime
processing could by itself facilitate the
perception of of
related objects.
addition to eliminating

m

these two

display types, the remaining display types
were modified in
the sense that peripheral objects no longer
occupied the

same position across display types.

Instead, for every

display type they were randomly assigned a position
on one
of the five corners of the imaginary pentagon.

This was

done in order to prevent subjects from learning to expect

specific objects at specific positions, which obviously
could affect both the selection of peripheral objects for

fixation and the time needed to identify them.

As in Experiment

1,

the six display types constructed in

this manner mapped onto six context conditions.

ment

1,

In Experi-

this mapping was determined by the episodic member-
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Ship Of the a priori
designated target object.
In the
present experiment, however,
it was determined by
the episodic membership of the
peripheral object that was
selected
for fixation by the subject.
Specifically, each fixation
fell into one of the six
following context conditions:
two
conditions with a fixation-related
object in the center and
one or three fixation-related
objects in the
periphery,

creating a Central Related /Peripheral
lated/Peripheral

l

and a Central Re-

condition; two conditions with a
fixation-unrelated object in the center and
zero or two fixation-related objects in the periphery,
producing a Central
Unrelated /Peripheral 0 and a Central
Unrelated /Peripheral 2
condition; and, finally, two conditions
with no object in
the center and either zero or three
fixation-related objects
in the periphery, resulting in a Central
Absent /Peripheral 0
and a Central Absent /Peripheral 3 condition.
3

The sets of choice alternatives for the object recogni-

tion task following each display were very similar to those

constructed for Experiment

1,

but were modified in order to

control for possible nuisance effects that could arise from
the within-subjects administration of the stimuli.

Specifi-

cally, rather than always probing for one of the same two

targets (i.e. Al and Bl in Table

1)

following all displays

constructed for a given category pair,

a

different target

was probed for each of the six display types used in this
experiment.

Targets were A2 for display la, B2 for display
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Bl for disDlav
Bpiay 2a,
o^*
no
B3 for display 2b,
A3 for display 2a'
and Al for display 2^.his modification was
introduced in
order to avoid that subjects
would learn that only a
limited
set Of Objects needed to
be detected in order
to perform the
recognition task and consequently
would attempt to detect
lb,

*r

.

specific Object features in the
displays they were presented
with,

In addition, an inspection of
Table

1

will reveal that

this ensured that if a central
object was present, there was
a 50 % chance that it would
be the target.
Consequently,
there was no reason for subjects to
be biased towards neglecting the central objects, which
would decrease any
effect controlled prime processing might
have.

Furthermore,

it guaranteed that if a central object
was present and the

target was located in the periphery, there
was
that they would be episodically related.

a 50 % chance

As a result,

subjects were not induced to systematically search
for
either central-related or central-unrelated peripheral
objects, which obviously would greatly compromise the
analysis of scanning patterns across the displays.

Finally,

it

ensured that if the target was located in the periphery, its
chances of being related versus unrelated to any of the
other objects in the display were 50-50. In this manner,

subjects were discouraged from adopting

a

strategy of sys-

tematically trying to find the object that was most dissimilar to the rest of the display.
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Apparatus anH procednT-o
AS in Experixnent

stimuli, sets of choice
alternatives
and mask were presented on
a Hewlett-Packard
1300A CRT with
a P-31 phosphor.
Eye movement patterns
during display
l,

exposure were monitored via a
Stanford Research Institute
Dual Purkinje eyetracker with a
resolution of lo- of arc and
a 1000 Hz sampling-rate.

The eyetracker and CRT were
interfaced with a Hewlett-Packard 2100
computer used for storage
of the images to be presented and
for keeping a complete
record of saccade latencies and eye
position,
in this
manner it was possible to terminate display
exposure and
present the mask once a peripheral object
had received a
fixation or no such fixation had occurred
within a period of
1 sec following display onset.

Upon arrival, subjects received the same instructions
given in Experiment 1 with the exception that they
were

asked to indicate the name of the object that had
been in
the display by tapping its serial number in the list of

choice alternatives on the table in front of them.

were seated
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Subjects

cm from the CRT, using a bite bar in order to

eliminate head movements and keep viewing distance constant.
Subsequently, the eyetracker was calibrated and subjects

received two series of 56 trials, each consisting of

8

practice trials (selected from the filler stimuli constructed for Experiment

1)

and 48 experimental trials.

trial included the same events described for Experiment

and again no feedback was provided until the end of the

Each
1,
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experiment which lasted about
40 to 45 minutes.

Design
Each subject received all 96
experimental stimuli (i.e.
display types X 16 episodic category
pairs) in

6

an in-

dividually randomized order.

How many observations this

resulted in for each of the six
context conditions naturally
depended on which peripheral objects
the subjects chose to

fixate in the various displays.

Assuming however, that

subjects would choose peripheral objects
at random, the distribution of the data over the context
conditions should be
as follows:

- 40 % of the observations for display types
la and lb

should fall in the Central Related/Peripheral

1

condi-

tion, and 60 % in the Central Unrelated/Peripheral

2

condition.
- 80 % of the observations for display types 2a and
2b

should fall in the Central Related/Peripheral
tion, and 20

%

3

condi-

in the Central Unrelated/Peripheral 0

condition.
- 80 % of the observations for display types 2a' and 2b'

should fall in the Central Absent/Peripheral
and 20

%

in the Central Absent/Peripheral

0

3

condition,

condition.

Consequently, in order to determine whether the likeli-

hood of peripheral object selection is affected by that
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Object's episodic relatednpc=o
xateaness to 4.^
the previously fixated
and/or other unattended
objects

in the display, one
should

examine how the actual
proportions of the data falling
into
each of the context conditions
deviated from what could
be
expected on the basis of random
selection.

it was therefore

decided to compute the observed
proportions across subjects
and perform chi-square tests on
the expected-observed differences for each of the three pairs
of complementary proportions, i.e. i) central Related/Peripheral
1

unrelated/Peripheral

2,

central Related/Peripheral

ii)

central Unrelated/Peripheral

sent/Peripheral

3

and Central

0,

3

and

and iii) the Central Ab-

and Central Absent/Peripheral

0.

As for the analysis of effects of Central
and Peripheral
Relatedness on first fixation durations, an
analysis of

variance could be performed on the generalized
randomized
block design (Federer, 1955; Kirk, 1982) resulting

from the

within-subjects administration of the context conditions.
However, the inevitable presence of unequal cell
n's
did

necessitate the use of the general linear model approach
(Kirk,

1982).

3.2.3

Results

In the following analyses, all trials were excluded on

which a track loss occurred
a peripheral object within a

(3
1

%)

,

subjects failed to fixate

sec period following display

.
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onset

or subjects „oved
their eyes away from the
display center in one direction
and ended up fixating a
(4

%)

,

peripheral object located in
another direction

(3

%)

The expected and observed
probabilities of fixating a
peripheral object in the various
context conditions are
presented in Table 4.

Table

4.

Expected and observed probabilities
of
^ a
peripheral object in each of the Contextselectina
conditions

CONTEXT CONDITION

1)

EXPECTED

Central Related/Peripheral

1

OBSERVED

.400

.38

(n=86)

.600

.62

(n=142)

.800

.73

(n=173)

.200

.27

(n=64)

3

.800

.78

(n=176)

Central Absent/Peripheral 0

.200

.22

(n=50)

+

2)

Central Unrelated/Peripheral

3)

Central Related/Peripheral

2

3

+
4)

Central Unrelated/Peripheral

5)

Central Absent/Peripheral

0

+
6)

The data presented here, show that no clear discrepancies

between expected and observed probabilities emerged.

This

was confirmed by insignificant chi-square tests of expected-

observed differences in the data-distributions over the
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complexaentary conditions
.05], conditions

3

and

4

i

and

[chi-square = .952, p >
[chi-square = x.155, p >
2

.05], and

conditions

5

and

6

[chi-square = 1.418 £ >
.05].

This absence of systematic
effects of Central or
Peripheral Relatedness on peripheral
object selection indicates
that either episodic dissimilarity
does not inevitably imply
featural dissimilarity, or that
featural dissimilarity does
not determine the direction of
attentional shifts in the
paradigm employed in this experiment.
Either way, the
absence of a Central Relatedness effect
runs counter
to the

hypothesis that the unrelated target superiority
in Experiment 1 should be attributed to covert
attentional
shifts

towards these objects.

Furthermore, the failure to find any

Peripheral Relatedness effects in either the
Central Present
or Central Absent conditions replicates the
results

obtained

in Experiment 1.

it provides converging evidence for con-

cluding that "pop-out" effects are not a fundamental characteristic of object perception in displays containing
isolated objects with different episodic category memberships.

Admittedly, it could be pointed out, that in spite

of the insignificant expected-observed differences in the

three data-distributions there appears to be a consistent

tendency towards selecting the unrelated objects (i.e. 2.2

%

for the first distribution, 7% for the second, and 2.2.% for

the third)

.

In view of previous evidence for such a bias

(e.g. Loftus & Mackworth,

1978)

this could be taken to
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suggest that there is a
small
small «f^f^
effect of^ episodic relatedness
in the peripheral object
selection data, which went
unnoticed because of a lack
of statistical power.
it should
be noted, however, that
even if this is the case,
the effect
size (i.e. 2-7%) does appear
too small to explain
4-

the 9-14%

unrelated target superiority in
Experiment
computed per subject and per
distribution,

Also, when

l.

the bias towards
selecting unrelated objects did
not appear to be very consistent since it was found for only
4 subjects in the
first
distribution, 4 in the second and 3
in the third.

The analysis of the first fixation
durations revealed a
significant main effect of context condition
[F(5,35) =

3.412, E < .05].

Mean first fixation durations (FFD) for
each of the context conditions are presented
in Table
5.

Planned comparisons using the Dunn-Sidak procedure
(Kirk,
1982) revealed that the 40 ms difference between
conditions
1

and

2

was significant [tDS(35) = 2.939, p < .05].

This

indicates that controlled object processing primes the

representations of episodically related objects and facilitates subsequent perceptual processing of these objects.

Additional support for this conclusion was provided by the
significant 59 ms difference between conditions
[tDS(35) = 3.966, p < .05].

3

and

4

Although the latter difference

was somewhat larger, suggesting an effect of the number of

peripheral primes and consequently of automatic prime processing, further comparisons failed to confirm this hypothe-
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sis.

specifically, the insignificant
difference between
conditions 5 and 6 ttDS(35) =
.377, p > .lo, indicates that

Table

5.

Mean first fixation durations
(FFD) per
Context condition (in ms)

CONTEXT CONDITION
1)

2)

FFD

Central Related/Peripheral

1

Central Unrelated/Peripheral

2

252

(n==86)

292

(n==142)

227

(n==173)

286

(n==64)

3)

Central Related/Peripheral

4)

Central Unrelated/Peripheral

5)

Central Absent/Peripheral

3

245

(n=176)

6)

Central Absent/Peripheral

0

251

(n= 50)

3

0

automatic prime processing was insufficient to by itself
facilitate the identification of primed objects.

The ab-

sence of a significant difference between conditions

2

and

4

[tDS(35) = .394, p > .10] is completely in line with this

finding.

tions

1

Finally, while the 25 ms difference between condi-

and

3

suggests that extrafoveal objects could per-

haps exert a priming influence when presented in the company
of a related foveal object, it does not reach significance
[tDS(35) = 1.894, p > .10].

Admittedly, this exploration of the first fixation data

.
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for effects of central
and peripheral primes could
be criticized for being somewhat
fragmentary in its use of
multipl e
pairwise comparisons. it
therefore appears to be
worthwhil e
to report the results of
an alternative analysis
which is
less susceptible to this
criticism.
Specifically, if the
central prime effect is designated
as c and the peripheral
prime effect as
the difference between the
means of conditions 1 and 2 (i.e. 61) can be
regarded as reflecting c,

While P is reflected by the difference
between means
(i.e. 53).
Following an additive logic, the

5

and

6

difference

between means

result of C+P.

3

and

4

(i.e.

can then be viewed as the

52)

On this view, estimates of c and P
can be

obtained, which derive from the data
of all context conditions simultaneously. Specifically, for
C this estimate is
provided by the equation {S1+(S2-S3)
and for P it can be
) /2
found in the equation (<S3+(52-<!>l) /2. Following
)
their
,

computation for each subject, these equations yield
an
average C estimate of 4 6.5 ms and an average P

estimate of

12.5 ms.

Apart from confirming the conclusions of the first

analysis (i.e. a significant effect of central prime pro-

cessing [t(7) = 2.83, E

<

.05]

and a non-significant effect

of peripheral prime processing [t(7) = 1.06, p

>

.10]),

it

is interesting to note that the size of the central prime

effect is quite comparable to that of the priming effects

observed in the Henderson et al.
30-60 ms)

(1987,

1988)

studies (i.e.

84

The xnain focus of the
experixnents reported above,
was to
explore the existence and
the characteristics of
a pricing
mechanism operating between
representations of
objects

likely to appear in the same
real-world scene.
While the unrelated target
superiority

in the Foveal

Present conditions of Experiment

1

provided only indirect

evidence for the presence of such
a process, direct proof
was found in the decrease of
first fixation durations for

central-related objects in Experiment
the absence in Experiment

1

2.

Given this result,

of an increase in target re-

cognition performance contingent upon
the presence of either
foveal or extrafoveal primes, suggested
that priming does
not facilitate the identification of
unattended
objects.

Evidence in agreement with this conclusion
has also been
presented by Boyce, Pollatsek, and Rayner

(1989) who found

peripheral target detection in tachistoscopically
presented
scenes to be independent of the episodic relatedness

between

the target and other objects in the scene.

These results

are entirely compatible with the view (Reinitz, Wright,
Loftus, 1989; Warren

&

&

Morton, 1982) that meaning-based

priming does not facilitate object identification by bringing a conceptual object representation so close to the

activation level required to set off an identification
response that a minimal amount of consistent visual information is sufficient to pass this threshold.

Rather, priming

.
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aids the identif
i<-»+-i«« of
nrification
isolated objects by increasing
the rate at which the
object- s features are
extracted fro»
the inage in a capacity-limited
process (Biederman, Blickle
Teitelbau», . Klatsky, 1988,
requiring both visual acuity
and a sufficiently selective
allocation of visual attention
(Strong & Whitehead, 1989)
•

in addition to this need for
attention to the target in
order for priming to surface,
controlled processing of the
prime seems to be a necessary
condition for priming to
originate, as indicated by the
absence of a significant
effect Of peripheral primes on
first fixation durations in

Experiment

2.

while this conclusion is corroborated
by the

Henderson et al.

(1988)

failure to find a target-display

consistency effect, it could perhaps be
viewed as too strong
given the suggestion of a peripheral prime
effect in Experi-

ment

2

conditional upon the simultaneous presence
of a

foveal prime.

However, contrary to the Henderson et al.

experiments, the task conditions in this experiment
did not
favor a standard sequence for leisurely fixating
all objects
in the displays.

As a result it is not impossible that an

initially wide distribution or even a selective covert shift
of attention may have preceded the first peripheral object

fixation, thus allowing for a facilitation of peripheral

prime processing by the central prime.

Such a facilitation

could then lead to sufficiently detailed pattern recognition
of peripheral primes, in order to cause an additional

priming benefit for the first related object that is fixa-
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ted.

consequently, while this
would perhaps challenge a
strict sequential .odel of
visual attention (Henderson
et
al., 1989), it would still
be consistent with the
claims
that priming requires the
allocation of attention to
the
prime and will only facilitate
extrafoveal information use
for attended objects (Henderson
et al., 1988).

Based on the above characterization
of episodic priming,
some predictions can be made which
should allow for an
unambiguous test of the role of this
mechanism in the appearance of object probability effects
on object identification in scenes. Specifically, if episodic
inter-object
priming is solely responsible for these effects,
object

identification should not be easier for

1)

probable objects

that are the first object attended to in a scene,

2)

le objects that are not selectively attended
to, and

probab3)

probable objects attended to after attending to an improbable object.
As was already mentioned, research reported by Biederman
and colleagues clearly contradicts all three predictions in
its claim to have established superior perceptibility for

any probable object at any position in any natural scene

that is presented for a mere 100-150 ms.

Recently, this

claim has been reaffirmed in a study (Boyce, Pollatsek,

&

Rayner, 1989) revealing that target-background consistency
is a crucial determinant of this immediate object probabi-

lity effect on pre-cued target detection, while the target's
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episodic relatedness to other
objects in the display i.LS
Wholly irrelevant. However,
as argued in Chapter 1, thi.
LS
kind of research can be criticized
for its susceptibility to
the influence of post-perceptual
response strategies obscuring genuine perceptual effects
of scene context on
object processing. The large
reduction in task performance
when, as in Experiment l, accuracy
of forced choice
recogni-

tion is measured rather than accuracy
of simple presentabsent decisions, only serves to strengthen

this suspicion.

Moreover, even if it can be assumed that
the observed
effects are indeed perceptual, they are by
no means mandatory, as some authors claim (Klatsky et
al.,
1981).

Recently, De Graef, Christiaens and d'Ydewalle
(1990) reported on the context-sensitivity of first fixation
durations
for objects incidentally fixated during the free exploration
of a scene in search for non-objects (Kroll

&

Potter, 1984).

With respect to object probability effects, they found that
such effects clearly did not surface from the very first

scene fixation on but rather developed gradually over the

course of scene exploration.

At the very least, this leaves

open the possibility that, under some conditions, individual

object processing and subsequent inter-object priming may be
at the basis of object probability effects.

Specifically,

when one looks at the differences between a task allowing
only one glimpse at a scene in order to detect an object at
an uncertain position and a task allowing for free scene

exploration in search for non-objects, the crucial deter-
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minant of differences in the
characteristics of context
effects may be the mode of
attentional distribution adopted
by the viewer.
indeed, the former type of
task is much more
likely to favor a wide distribution
of attention
across the

entire scene, favoring the
extraction and use of low-resolution, global information such as
scene
background.

m

the

latter type of task, however, a
sequential distribution of
attention to successively fixated
potential objects is more
appropriate, favoring the operation of
mechanisms
such as

the episodic priming described above.

Consequently, unless

the latter task can be demonstrated to be
a less adequate
approximation of everyday scene perception, a
rejection of
inter-object priming as an account of object
probability
effects in scenes will have to based on a direct

test of the

three

f orementioned

predictions under task conditions that

do not discourage or even prevent selective attention
to

individual objects in the scene.

Until then, an identifica-

tion advantage for the probable objects in a real-world
scene can not be taken as a sound basis for rejecting data-

driven models of object identification in favor of conceptdriven accounts.

APPENDIX

EPISODICAL
CATEGORIES
1)

Gas Station

Orchestra
2)

3

)

4)

EXTRAFOVEAL
TARGET*;

car

piano

6

)

7)

8)

EXPERIMENTAL

FOVEAL
PRIMES

EXTRAFOVEAL PRIMES

gaspump

motorcycle

jerry
can

bus

uuipen

violin

flute

horn

i-i

Laundry Room

iron

shirt

dress

tie

Playgrounds

football
helmet

football

baseball
bat

tennisracket

baseball

horse

sheep

rooster

scythe

cat

Living Room

rocking
chair

televi"
sion

dresser

lamp

vacuum
cleaner

Street

bus

fire
hydrant

bicycle

traffic
light

motorcycle

triage

scale

egg
timer

garbage
can

salt
shaker

wineglass

bottle

pot

Farm

Kitchen

5^

A:

Dinner Tam<»

lor K

Toolshed

axe

paintbrush

saw

file

Garden

watering
can

shears

spade

hose

Laundry Room

sweater

pants

ironing
board

dress

tie

Pole

penguin

igloo

seal

polar
bear

walrus

Farm

Dia

barn

sheep

scythe

tractor

Kitchen

kettle

frying
pan

rolling
pin

pitcher

blender

Bathroom

blowdryer

comb

toothpaste

toothbrush

hairbrush
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9)

10)

Playgrounds

wagon

tricycle

roller
skates

kite

skate
board

Office

telephone

desk

computer

stapler

envelope

Street

traffic
light

bicycle

parking
meter

bus

ambulance

Farm

cow

chicken

goose

pier

tractor

roller

pitchfork

wheelbarrow

spade

rake

Living room

couch

table

vacuum
cleaner

chair

lamp

Toolshed

drill

pliers

paintbrush

screwdriver

wrench

Vegetable
Stand

pepper

carrot

artichoke

onion

mushroom

apple

banana

pear

pineapple

melon

Playgrounds

skate board

roller
skates

top

tricycle

baseball
bat

Bedroom

dresser

bed

alarmclock

chair

lamp

Street

motorcycle

parking
meter

car

truck

eimbu-

goat

rooster

horse

milkcan

dog

drum

guitar

trumpet

xylophone

flute

wheelbarrow

spade

roller

hose

shears

coffee pot

funnel

toaster

blender

rolling
pin

11) Garden

12)

13) Fruit Basket

14)

15) Farm

Orchestra

16) Garden

Kitchen

lance

:

EPISODICAL
CATEGORIES
1)

Gas station

Orchestra
2

)

Laundry room

Playgrounds

3

)

Farm

Living room

CHOICE SETS FOR EXPERIMENTAL
STIMULI

TARGETS

car

airpump

fire hydrant

truck

piano

drum

xy lopnone

saxophone

iron

pants

ironing
board

skirt

football
helmet

f risbee

skateboard

ball

horse

goose

barn

dog

rocking

turntable

couch

vase

car

ambulance

parking
meter

ha

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

^

V

Street

Kit chf»n

StOVG

frying pan

pot

blender

Dinner table

fork

spoon

pitcher

ladle

Toolshed

axe

drill

wrench

pliers

Garden

watering
can

rake

roller

lawnmower

owoau6r

clothes
rack

iron

skirt

whale

harpoon

sled

Pole

Farm

pig

horse

dog

well

Kitchen

kettle

pot

toaster

egg timer

soap

razor

shaving
brush

Bathroom

9)

DISTRACTORS

Playgrounds

wagon

tennisracket

baseball
bat

ball

Office

telephone

paperpunch

ashtray

typewriter
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10)

Street

Farm
11) Garden

Living room
12) Toolshed

Vegetable
stand
13) Fruit basket

Playgrounds
14)

Bedroom
Street

15) Farm

Orchestra
16) Garden

Kitchen

traffic
light

truck

mailbox

motorcycle

cow

dog

sheep

barn

hose

lawnmower

spray can

vase

telephone

dresser

drill

file

saw

hammer

pepper

corn

tomato

cellery

apple

coconut

orange

grapes

skateboard

slingshot

wagon

scooter

dresser

pajamas

radio

pillow

motorcycle

fire hydrant

bus

mailbox

goat

sheep

cow

tractor

drum

horn

piano

violin

wheelbarrow

rake

lawnmower

lawnchair

coffee pot

grill

cup

pot

roller
couch

C:

PRACTICE AND CONTROL

FOVEAL TARGETS
1)

2)

3)
4)
5)
6)

shoe

mouse

anchor
cannon
sock

whistle

EXTRAFOVEAL UNRELATED OBJECTS
door

whistle

banana
funnel

broom

knife

tie

squirrel

lightbulb

glass

moon

boat

leaf

onion

bell

screw

key

pipe

window

pitcher

apple

star

pear

bell

cup

broom

squirrel

pipe

i-

iuue

bat
7)

spoon

tootn—
paste

moon

bat

rabbit

anchor

pineapple

lightbulb

leaf

hairbrush

tie

flower

shoe

key

glass

cat

window

hat

egg timer

cannon

door

fire hydrant

onion

boat

scythe

toothbrush

rolling
pin

chicken

knife

bell

vacuum
cleaner

jerry
can

goat

envelope

14) pipe

pear

lamp

comb

file

mushroom

15) glass

sock

whistle

lock

flower

hat

8)

9)

10)

lock

11) pitcher

12) broom

13)

scissors

stool

16)

squirrel

toothpaste

cup

pineapple

shoe

egg timer

17)

lightbulb

broom

pipe

moon

key

cannon

18)

bat

flute

roller
skate

leaf

glass

door

93

n

94

APPENDIX C (Continued)

19)

20)

rabbit

star

21) chicken
22) envelope
23)

24)

knife

screw

apple

paintbrush

cat

anchor

banana

till

pitcher

broom

scissors

pipe

mushroom

ambu 1 a

mouse

whistle

pear

leaf

onion

toothbrush

vacuum
cleaner

jerrycan

file

boat

rolling
pin

leimp

comb

goat

bell

I-

Xcs

n*^/^t.»

baseball
bat
stool

1

APPENDIX

D:

SETS FOR PRACTICE
AND CONTROL

TARGETS
DISTRACTORS
1

)

2

)

shoe

anchor

4)

cannon

5

sock

6)
7

)

8)
9)

10)
11)

skate

clog

cat

rat

boat

raft

bazooka

machine gun

pants

boot

horn

flute

rattle

knife

pitcher

rolling pin

key

chain

door

bee

tree

leaf

scarf

umbrella

f unne

cup

knife

dustpan

mop

bucket

thread

button

cigarette

lighter

cup

jug

mouse

3)

)

boot

whistle
spoon
lock
flower

surf boa r-H

tank

hat

pitcher

12) broom
13)

scissors

14)

pipe

cLoiiK^L cty

15) glass
16)

scpiirrel

17)

lightbulb

18) bat

tree

cat

owl

light switch

lamp

mouse

cat

19)

rabbit

fox

squirrel

20)

star

satceiite

rocket

21)

chicken

coop

22) envelope

paper clip

pen

stamp

23)

knife

bread

butter

cheese

24)

screw

nail

hammer

file
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NOTES

1.

Naturally, a failure to
observe any target
recognition
accuracy differences in
the present experiment
would be
difficult to interpret as
showing that priming is
indeed
constrained to controlled
object-processing, since
prime-target relatedness in all
stimuli is defined
episodically rather than semantically
the absence of any
effects could also mean that
priming is constrained to
semantically related objects. It
was decided to filter
out this interpretational problem
in a separate
,

experiment should it arise.
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